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This thesis conducted an examination related to Department of Defense (DOD) 
weapons systems production-approval practices. Current practices result in poor weapons 
systems production outcomes that reduce fleet readiness in DOD weapons systems 
acquisition. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has reported concerns related 
to a lack of manufacturing knowledge at production start as causal to poor production 
outcomes. A comparison of DOD practices against non-DOD industrial production 
approval processes addressing causality and improvement opportunity provided new 
insight not found in acquisition research. An analysis of alternatives identified best 
practices to improve production capability and readiness. Key findings revealed that the 
automotive production approval process followed industry best practices that fully 
addressed problems identified by the GAO. Non-DOD industries used a more 
prescriptive Quality Management System (QMS) that enabled a more disciplined 
manufacturing development and demonstration of production capability prior to 
production commitment. Commercial surveys in the literature confirmed the benefits of 
the automotive prescriptive QMS. The more successful QMS approach can be applied to 
DOD acquisition practices reducing costs and improving fleet readiness. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Poor production outcomes in Department of Defense (DOD) weapon systems 
acquisition are costly and adversely affect fleet readiness. National security demands a 
highly capable and ready fleet to respond to a complex global threat environment. One 
agency charged with oversight of weapon systems acquisition is the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO). Annual GAO reports on select weapon programs show a 
persistent and troubling observation revealing poor production outcomes in DOD 
acquisition (Dodaro 2013). Dodaro identified three reasons for DOD weapons systems 
poor production outcomes: 1) knowledge gaps in technology, 2) design instability and 3) 
manufacturing knowledge gaps. Only manufacturing knowledge gaps lacked DOD 
attention. Additional details reported by Dodaro concerning manufacturing causality 
included: 1) use of non-standard processes, 2) failure to identify critical manufacturing 
processes, and 3) failure to apply statistical process control.  
The current state of DOD acquisition of weapon systems follows the defense 
acquisition system consisting of law, policy, instruction and other guidance documents. A 
current-state system operational view is shown in Figure 1. DOD guidance pays little 
attention to manufacturing during engineering and manufacturing development (EMD). 
The acquisition process related to manufacturing development relies upon a contractor’s 
discretion. The DOD provides oversight by using risk-based assessments. Dodaro (2013) 
pointed out that non-DOD industries followed a standard and more knowledge-based 
approach, confirming production readiness. As a result, the GAO recommended that the 
DOD deploy a more disciplined approach to manufacturing development and production 
approval pointing to the success in non-DOD industries. 
The GAO findings provided motivation for this research, which examined the 
DOD acquisition process against alternative, non-DOD, industrial production approval 
processes. This study fills a significant gap in the research with respect to weapon 
systems’ poor production outcomes. An analysis of alternatives (AOA) comparing the 
production approval processes of DOD and non-DOD industries identified an opportunity 
for improvement over the current-state DOD production approval process. Key findings 
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revealed that the automotive approach followed industry best practices that fully 
addressed the GAO concerns of a lack of manufacturing knowledge at production start. 
The non-DOD industries used a more prescriptive set of quality standards that enabled a 
more disciplined development and demonstration of production capability prior to 
production commitment. 
The AOA relied upon the identification of industry best practices. A set of high-
level stakeholder needs were identified and related to a set of best-practice attributes for 
production approval processes. Characteristics found within the non-DOD production 
approval practices were not observed within the DOD processes, giving an indication 
why non-DOD industries enjoyed more successful production outcomes: 
 Third-party compliance to quality system standards 
 Prescriptive advanced quality practices   
 Common quality requirements levied to the entire supply network  
 Knowledge-based demonstration of production capability     
 Certification warrant demonstrating production readiness   
 Quality metrics assessing user satisfaction 
Central to the findings in support of the study AOA was an assessment of two 
fundamental types of Quality Management Systems (QMS) that are used in industry. 
There were remarkable differences in production success depending on the type of QMS 
used by an organization. While all industrial sectors incorporated the International 
Standards Organization’s (ISO) ISO-9000 family of commercial standards, only the 
automotive sector applied a more prescriptive quality standard. The automotive sector 
used the QS-9000 family of standards published by the Automotive Industry Action 
Group. The more prescriptive QMS provided structure for the disciplined development 
and demonstration leading to a certification of production capability. The QS-9000 
requirements identified by an automotive original equipment manufacturer (OEM) were 
flowed to the entire automotive supply network. In contrast, the DOD sector was found to 
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apply the ISO-9000 type QMS lacking the prescriptive nature of the automotive 
standards.  
There were three alternative industrial sectors examined in this study. All three of 
the non-DOD sectors studied used a certification process for production approval. Only 
the DOD did not use a certification process. 
Commercial surveys confirmed the benefits of the prescriptive quality standards. 
The benefits reported were pivotal to this study’s preferred solution selection. The 
adherence by suppliers to the automotive QMS showed improved quality and better 
production outcomes. Data obtained from the Department of Transportation supported 
the benefits in product reliability growth over time in the automotive sector. The 
assessment of alternate production approval processes provided compelling evidence in 
favor of the prescriptive automotive production approval process.  
An example that could be followed by the DOD is the approach taken by the 
automotive industry when they deployed the implementation of a prescriptive QMS 
process. The automotive supply base used the services of the Automotive Industry Action 
Group (AIAG) to prepare to meet new quality requirements. The AIAG was a consortium 
formed by the American OEMs to communicate, train and enable the implementation of 
the QS-9000 set of prescriptive standards.  
The automotive QS-9000 standard (later renamed ISO/TS-16949) is consistent 
with the DOD’s requirement to use voluntary consensus standards and is identified in the 
Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR §46.202-4). A new aerospace standard released by 
the Society of Automotive Engineers, AS-9145, describes an advanced product quality 
planning and production part approval process. This standard captures the intent of the 
automotive production approval process available for DOD application.  
It is the recommendation of this research that the DOD adopt the automotive 
production approval approach. The automotive QMS success experience can be applied 
to the DOD to reduce acquisition costs and improve fleet readiness. A future ideal-state 
operational view is shown in Figure 2. This figure highlights the integration of best 
practices found in non-DOD organizations. The non-DOD industries have developed a 
 xx 
more disciplined manufacturing model with product and process verification required 
prior to the start of production. 
 
Figure 1. (OV-1) DOD Descriptive (Current) State 
 
Figure 2. (OV-1) DOD Normative (Ideal) State 
Reference 
Dodaro, Gene L. 2013. Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. (GAO-13-294SP). 
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National security requires an ability to develop military capability in a complex 
political and economic global environment. Given the nature of an ever-changing military 
threat coupled with challenging economic pressures, there is a clear need to ensure that 
best-value outcomes occur within the federal weapon systems acquisition process. 
However, this has not always been the case. Certain manufacturing readiness issues in 
particular have resulted in poor production outcomes. An analysis of alternatives (AOA) 
to investigate Department of Defense (DOD) and non-DOD production approval 
processes may identify an opportunity to improve production outcomes in defense 
acquisition. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reporting has provided 
insight towards understanding specific deficiencies found in weapons system acquisition. 
1. Poor Production Outcomes  
Annual GAO reports on select weapon programs show a persistent and troubling 
observation revealing poor production outcomes in DOD acquisition (Dodaro 2013). 
Dodaro identified three reasons behind the poor production outcomes: 1) knowledge gaps 
in technology, 2) design-instability and 3) knowledge gaps in manufacturing. Of these 
three causes, only knowledge gaps in manufacturing lacked DOD attention. Additional 
details reported by Dodaro concerning manufacturing causality of poor production 
outcomes included: 1) use of non-standard processes, 2) failure to identify critical 
manufacturing processes and 3) failure to apply statistical process control prior to 
production start (2013, 170). 
According to Dodaro, the DOD acquisition process lacked a standard and 
systematic knowledge-based transition-to-production (TTP) in support of a production 
decision occurring at Milestone C (MS C). Key findings in the 2013 GAO report revealed 
that the acquisition of weapon systems often fail to deliver reliable and mature 
technologies into the Production and Deployment (PD) phase from the Engineering and 




has been poor production outcomes after MS C. Such outcomes adversely affect cost, 
schedule, performance and related military readiness in the field of operations. A look at 
the manufacturing causality invites further review (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1.  GAO’s Three Factors Resulting in Poor Production Outcomes. 
Adapted from Dodaro (2013). 
2. GAO Questions the DOD Production Approval Process 
The GAO found prime contractors in DOD acquisition lacked a standard 
approach to achieve a stable and mature production process at the MS C decision point. 
In 2002, the GAO had reported their observation that there was a lack of a systematic and 
standard knowledge-based production readiness approach in DOD acquisition (Schinasi 
2002). This lack of discipline was not characteristic of other industries the GAO 
reviewed. These findings led the GAO to recommend that the DOD look to other 
industries in hopes of finding improvement opportunity.  
The DOD acknowledged the GAO’s finding that there were no standard methods 
followed related to manufacturing development and production capability verification 
prior to MS C. This finding establishes why many programs fail to reach performance 




processes was the observation of a more disciplined product development and production 
demonstration process (Schwartz 2013, 27) and (USD[AT&L] 2015). However, there 
were no significant policy actions taken by the DOD concerning the GAO’s findings 
towards a more knowledge-based manufacturing development approach. 
3. DOD Acquisition and Production Approval  
The DOD’s requirements related to manufacturing development are found in the 
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) reference manual. The 
JCIDS describes requirements on how a program development is conducted and outlines 
the requirements for a life cycle phased acquisition process. With respect to 
manufacturing development, the JCIDS requires a risk-based assessment of a program’s 
manufacturing maturity but does not require an actual production line demonstration. 
According to the JCIDS instruction, a program manager (PM) will report manufacturing 
risk to the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) through the capabilities production 
document (CPD) at MS C. However, if the risk-based assessment does not rise to a 
significant level of concern a PM is not required to report on manufacturing risk (JCS 
2015b).  
In contrast, non-DOD industry practices use a disciplined knowledge-based 
production approval process that demonstrates a manufacturing capability based on 
product from an actual production line to report product and process capability running at 
production rates. As such, it is easy to see a stark difference contrasting the DOD’s risk 
assessment approach that does not rely upon an actual production line experience to 
assess production capability to show readiness to produce (USD[AT&L] 2015, 26–29, 
84). This is why the GAO made recommendations to consider a knowledge-based 
production capability demonstration approach to determine production manufacturing 
readiness at the end of the EMD phase (Dodaro 2013).  
Defense acquisition using the JCIDS calls out a manufacturing risk assessment 
tool to evaluate a product’s production environment to measure manufacturing readiness 
level (MRL). The establishment and maintenance of the MRL tool is directed by the 




Engineering’s DOD Manufacturing Technology (MANTECH) (OSD 2012). The MRL 
procedure guides an evaluation that interrogates a contractor’s production environment’s 
maturity. Manufacturing assessments in this approach fail to identify actual production 
line performance capability. Therefore, the MRL risk assessment provides little insight 
into critical manufacturing data to support production decisions. 
Additional guidance within the defense acquisition system (DAS) related to 
manufacturing development and approval processes are found in the DOD Instruction 
(DODI) DODI-5000.02 (USD[AT&L] 2015). The DODI and JCIDS guidance falls far 
short of the discipline of non-DOD organizations where there is a requirement to validate 
an actual production capability. Of concern is the absence of manufacturing process 
capability data in MRL risk assessment reporting. A manufacturing readiness assessment 
does not rely upon a demonstration of production capability. Contractor fabricated 
product built in support of EMD only requires a contractor assert that a production 
environment is “production relevant.” This MRL assessment of relevant does not mean 
that that the early production or fabrication of product for Low-Rate Initial Production 
(LRIP) or Full Rate Production (FRP) is fully defined and validated.  
The DOD acquisition guidance, described in the Defense Acquisition Guidebook 
(DAG) on systems engineering (SE), stated that use of the OSD MRL Guidebook is but 
“one way” to assess manufacturing risk (USD[AT&L] 2013, chapter 4). The DAG did 
not go on to discuss any other ways of identifying manufacturing risk or point to any 
other best practices to inform how a program should assess production readiness. In DOD 
acquisition, the decision to go into a production contract allows a contractor to continue 
manufacturing development in PD with inherent manufacturing risk. Even if EMD 
fabricated items are successfully qualified to functional requirements little is known 
about an intended production line definition or its degree of manufacturing robustness in 
sustaining as-built product requirements.  
The JCIDS DODI 5000.02 and DAG confirm this minimalist approach to 
production definition and reporting of manufacturing risk (USD[AT&L] 2013). The 
DOD will conduct its last technical review in EMD as a final assessment of production 




this final inquiry based upon a checklist to measure program and manufacturing risk. This 
PRR is part of a program’s reporting to the MDA at MS C to gain approval for a 
production go-ahead. Early production will start with manufacturing development 
incomplete. During PD is when a contractor finally completes development of the 
manufacturing environment for production where the government acquisition process 
attempts to confirm production capability. The post-production assessment is a technical 
review called a Physical Configuration Audit (PCA).  
The PCA is a standard DOD practice that occurs after LRIP and prior to Full-Rate 
Production (FRP). The PCA event is used to legally define the saleable production 
baseline of the configured item for on-going production. According to the JCIDS, the 
PCA serves as a graduation event to enter FRP (USD[AT&L] 2015, 29). 
4. The Study Production Approval Process AOA 
The AOA conducted in this study relied upon the identification of industry best 
practices related to manufacturing development and process verification. A set of high-
level stakeholder needs were identified and related to a set of best practice attributes as 
used in disciplined production approval processes. Certain production approval process 
characteristics found within non-DOD production approval practices were not observed 
within the DOD processes. The additional production approval practices found in non-
DOD industries provided an indication why non-DOD industries enjoyed more 
successful production outcomes. Some of these differences in non-DOD organizations 
included: 
 Third-party compliance to quality system standards 
 Prescriptive advanced quality practices   
 Common quality requirements levied to the entire supply network  
 Knowledge-based demonstration of production capability     
 Certification warrant demonstrating production readiness   




B. CONTEXT OF THE PROBLEM 
The problem space of poor production outcomes related to manufacturing 
causality can be defined through the audit reports of the GAO, a review of the literature 
related to weapons system acquisition, DOD policy, DOD workforce capability and DOD 
actions that try to improve production outcomes. One observation within the DOD 
acquisition policy shows favoritism toward product performance development and 
verification and fails to provide the necessary guidance concerning knowledge-based 
manufacturing readiness. This is particularly significant at MS C where manufacturing 
readiness is assessed but production capability is not assessed. This failure to require a 
demonstrated production capability prior to MS C coupled with a contractor’s lack of 
discipline to develop key manufacturing knowledge during EMD transfers manufacturing 
risk into LRIP/FRP.  
One of the contributing factors related to poor production outcomes is DOD 
workforce competency. The lack of a broadly skilled workforce hinders the ability to 
develop and assess production maturity and capability. This occurs in DOD contracting 
and oversight because manufacturing expertise is not fully staffed or understood within 
DOD SE community. As such, the DOD lacks a standard and systematic method in 
developing manufacturing maturation and has failed to require verified process stability 
and control (Sullivan 2008). The DOD’s lopsided focus on product over process 
performance can also be seen by a review of the many product performance related 
technical reviews in acquisition (see Figure 2) (USD[AT&L] 2013). Conversely, non-
DOD organizations are staffed to develop and manage their manufacturing development 





Figure 2.  Life Cycle Development. Adapted from (USD[AT&L] 2013). 
The weakness related to a lack of a skilled professional manufacturing oversight 
can be traced to a memo (Perry 1994) that eliminated most prescriptive military standards 
(see “Appendix A. Perry Memo”). In 1994, the DOD moved to a Performance Based 
Acquisition (PBA) practice setting in motion the use voluntary consensus standards. 
When the PBA practice commenced, the DOD divested itself of the skills to assess 
integration and manufacturing development. Recently, the DOD recognized this loss of 
know-how and initiated a hiring of 20,000 acquisition professionals by the end of fiscal 
year 2015 (Erwin 2010). In National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA)’s Sandra 
Erwin’s blog, there was a posting concerning the 2009 Weapon Systems Acquisition 
Reform Act (WSARA) Progress Report. Here, Erwin chronicled GAO Director 
Sullivan’s response to a question from the House Oversight and Government Reform 
chairman, Rep. John Tierney, D-Mass:  
The law alone won’t result in substantial change unless there are leaders 
within the department enforcing it, he [Tierney] said. “It will take 
considerable and sustained leadership and effort to change the incentives 
and inertia that reinforce this status quo. And I think the Congress has a 
role in that as well.” 
Sullivan then posed an obvious and uncomfortable question: “One has to 
ask why extraordinary actions are needed to force practices that should 




of technology should have been part of the standard modus operandi and 
not required major legislation, he noted. 
Much of the blame for the shocking cost overruns and performance of 
major programs has been laid on the shortage of contracting personnel and 
technical experts at the Defense Department. WSARA reinforces the issue 
and calls for the Pentagon to beef up its in-house skills. Defense Secretary 
Gates last year announced plans to hire 20,000 acquisition professionals 
(ID 134). 
This communication captured by Erwin appears to identify one concern at the root 
of the manufacturing knowledge gap reported by the GAO: manufacturing expertise 
within the government acquisition process lacks experienced personnel resources. If 
fortified with manufacturing expertise, then there would likely be improved oversight and 
ability to assess a contractor’s manufacturing maturity accurately. In the short term, the 
DOD had developed a set of expert questions in the MRL and PRR checklists and 
communicated them to the combatant commanders (COCOMs) and PMs.  
The release of the DOD MRL guidebook indicated that the DOD was not satisfied 
with its current state of problems, in part, due to manufacturing issues (OSD 2012). The 
MRL process came about the same time as the WSARA hiring initiative in hopes that the 
assessment tool would improve manufacturing readiness and better document 
manufacturing risk. Unfortunately, the GAO findings since 2010 still discuss the problem 
of poor production outcomes from manufacturing workforce deficiencies. The 
manufacturing knowledge-gap problem is then related to the acquisition process and 
workforce expertise.  
The DOD also took steps to augment manufacturing expertise by the development 
of centers of manufacturing excellence. One center setup is the Department of Defense 
Research and Engineering (DODR&E). In support of the MRL, the DODR&E discussed 
the need to apply the MRL process in a development program (Dunn 2010). This 
recommendation was implemented by the DOD and is now specified as a required 
practice in the 2015 JCIDS. 
Another, but long-standing, center of excellence developed was the NDIA as a 




report on Air-Launched Tactical Weapons, the NDIA called for a certification of a 
product’s production readiness (NDIA Gulf Coast Chapter 2010, 19). It would be a novel 
approach for the DOD to use a knowledge-based certification for manufacturing 
readiness as recommendation by the NDIA.  
The DOD acquisition guidance initiative to monitor how a production line 
develops and matures using the MRL risk assessment process showed increased attention 
given to the manufacturing competency yet these actions only served to continue the 
DOD’s risk-based approach to manufacturing readiness. The DOD’s lack of response to 
the NDIA and GAO recommendations related to manufacturing improvement 
opportunity ignored the value placed on process verification used by non-DOD 
industries. The applications of best practices are the disciplined focus in a knowledge-
based manufacturing development. Failing to identify and improve production processes 
were missed opportunities for DOD acquisition to reduce problems related to production 
risk. Brock and Walker pointed out that product knowledge is obtained late in DOD 
acquisition as compared to organizations that follow best practices in non-DOD 
organizations (see Figure 3) (Brock 2003; Walker 2005). 
 





1. Problem Space Source Data Robustness 
Confidence in background information related to the problem space comes from 
examining the reliability of the reports used to describe DOD acquisition deficiencies. 
One question to answer was the degree of integrity of the findings as published by the 
GAO. To answer this, the GAO assured integrity based on long-standing ethics they 
apply to their investigative reporting (see “Appendix B”). An additional strength in the 
quality of the information dealing with the problem space definition was found in the 
GAO’s reporting and the DOD responses to GAO recommendations. In one responsive 
letter, the DOD took some exception to the GAO’s findings but indicated that the DOD 
would conduct their own report on the issues discussed. See Appendix G - DOD Memo 
to GAO. At times, the GAO reports discussed how the DOD implemented or planned to 
implement various actions to satisfy the GAO recommendations. The GAO would 
provide a status in the following year’s report if the DOD acted upon any 
recommendation. Therefore, these periodic reports provided a continuum of objective 
observations on issues identified through the GAO reporting. 
Consider the problem space represented by manufacturing deficiencies resulting 
from a lack of manufacturing requirements definition. Since manufacturing development 
has not had much attention in DOD acquisition, there is an omission of process capability 
requirements definition. Non-DOD manufacturing development follows an approach that 
prevents poor production outcomes by addressing manufacturing requirements early.  
Objective manufacturing and quality requirements in non-DOD organizations are 
typically defined through customer or regulatory guidance and is explicitly expressed in 
the execution of an organization’s quality management system (QMS). Adhering to the 
practices outlined in a QMS helps define a contractor’s business practices related to 
manufacturing and quality policy. DOD acquisition practices have customarily invoked 
the International Standards Organizations ISO-9000 or similar AS-9000 family of quality 
standards that do not require customer or regulatory requirements to be defined. The 
automotive supply base followed specific customer requirements given in the QS-9000 
QMS published by the Automotive Industry Action Group (AIAG). The AIAG has been 




automotive supply network as a consortium formed by the American original equipment 
manufacturers to communicate, train and enable the implementation of the QS-9000 set 
of prescriptive standards.  
The ISO technical specification (TS) ISO/TS-16949 (successor to the original QS-
9000 QMS) is related to the automotive industry. It is interesting that the CFR references 
these QMS; however, the DOD has not taken an active role to invoke these more 
disciplined QMS (Appendix H - CFR, Title 48, 46.202.4) and (Walker 2006). In addition, 
the National Institute of Standards reported on the problem space with its 
recommendation to use the automotive QMS (Breitenberg 1999). While these references 
indicate that DOD could elect to include production requirements characteristic of the 
automotive prescriptive standards it is not followed. The DOD tends to shy away from 
how-to requirements based upon acquisition practices since the Perry memo giving 
attention to product performance rather than manufacturing development and process 
capability verification. 
Even with several initiatives in workforce development, the DOD does not seem 
to address the root cause of poor production results related to manufacturing. The DOD 
had not required contractors to follow a disciplined development of manufacturing 
requirements likely due to the absence of an accepted prescriptive standard. Assessments 
of risk to determine the state of readiness to produce did not lend itself to process 
improvement for manufacturing capability in defense acquisition. Even contractual 
incentive type contracts have been problematic to improve the state of contracting or in 
validation of manufacturing development and capability knowledge. According to one 
review of incentive based contracts there has been an $8-billion-dollar giveaway not 
achieving results (Calvaresi-Barr 2005). 
1. Supporting Data Concerning Poor Production Outcomes 
Given that there is a lack of manufacturing knowledge at production decision in 
the DOD acquisition process, what impact is there on fleet readiness? This question can 
be answered by the examination of several reports and problem related datasets 




 First, the problem space of poor production related to manufacturing and quality 
are chronicled in a GAO report to Congress that reviewed 11 major weapon systems 
(Figure 4) (Sullivan 2008). The Senate also looked for answers by asking the GAO to 
consider a review of best practices in 2002 and to look for alternatives to improve 
(Schinasi 2002). The highlights section of the GAO report by Sullivan (2008) spoke to 
these type results with industries outside of the DOD stating: “In contrast, leading 
commercial companies GAO contacted use more disciplined systems engineering, 
manufacturing, and supplier quality practices.” In summary, the most meaningful way to 
look at the DOD product approval process problem space is by examining the GAO 
findings within their basis for improvement recommendations. Interestingly, the GAO 
recommendations did not provide a clear path for improvement.  
 
Figure 4.  Weapon System Quality Problems. Source: Sullivan (2008). 
Second, the Department of the Navy (DON) Red Stripe data that tracks failures 
that ground the fleet and data provided by the Defense Science Board (DSB) concerning 





The Red Stripe data set presents a proportional contribution of failure causes from 
the individual failure events that grounded aircraft. See Figure 5. The data segregates 
causal factors into five categories on a percentage basis: manufacturing/quality (33.6%), 
age/fatigue (27.3%), design (12.5%), maintenance (22.4%) and those not yet determined 
(4.2%).  
 
Figure 5.  Causal Factors Assigned to Red Stripe Events. 
ARMY development program results provided by the DSB Taskforce on 
Development Test and Evaluation (DT&E) “Final Report of DSB Taskforce on DT&E” 
observed that almost two thirds of the programs monitored fell below planned reliability 
performance. Reliability is expressed as an average such as, mean-time-between_ 
(MTB_). Here, MTB_ is a measure such as the mean time between - operational failures 





Figure 6.  Demonstrated Reliability versus Requirements. Source: DSB (2008).  
2. Risk and Knowledge-Based Decision Models 
Government Accountability Office reporting has characterized poor production 
outcomes due to an acquisition approach that focuses on risk over knowledge. This 
bounds the GAO argument as they make assertions about the DOD’s need for 
improvement. Since the GAO looked at better performing production outcomes in non-
DOD industries it became important to focus on manufacturing and production approval 
processes in those industries. The primary conclusion of the GAO involved the need for a 
more knowledge-based decision process. 
a. Contrasting Risk and Knowledge-Based Decisions 
When the GAO discusses a knowledge-based approach to characterize the success 
of non-DOD producers, it is useful to review what they meant by knowledge-based 
decisions (Figure 7). Between the years 1996 and 2013 the GAO developed its 
assessment framework consistent with its former findings. Later reporting by the GAO 





Figure 7.  Knowledge Point Observations. Source: Dodaro (2013). 
The GAO reported that non-DOD programs followed a disciplined production 
development and process demonstration practice that achieved better product reliability. 
The GAO indicated that non-DOD best practices required a demonstration of production 
capability using statistical control prior to production commitment. The GAO defined 
three knowledge points in their weapons program assessment framework. Knowledge 
point three was concerned with manufacturing (Dodaro 2014) (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8.  Knowledge Point 3 Criteria. Source: Dodaro (2014). 
The Acquisition Community Connection website managed by the Defense 
Acquisition University (DAU) provided a definition of a knowledge-based acquisition 
approach (DAU 2015a):  
Knowledge-Based acquisition is a management approach which requires 




throughout the acquisition process to make informed decisions. DOD 
Directive 5000.1 calls for sufficient knowledge to reduce the risk 
associated with program initiation, system demonstration, and full-rate 
production. DOD Instruction 5000.2 provides a partial listing of the types 
of knowledge, based on demonstrated accomplishments that enable 
accurate assessments of technology and design maturity and production 
readiness (ID 24660). 
and 
E1.14. Knowledge-Based acquisition. PMs [Program Managers] shall 
provide knowledge about key aspects of a system at key points in the 
acquisition process. PMs shall reduce technology risk, demonstrate 
technologies in a relevant environment, and identify technology 
alternatives, prior to program initiation. They shall reduce integration risk 
and demonstrate product design prior to the design readiness review. They 
shall reduce manufacturing risk and demonstrate producibility prior to 
full-rate production (ID 24660). 
A knowledge-based approach related to manufacturing readiness assessment in 
the DOD is deferred to full-rate production. There is a risk versus knowledge struggle 
that favors risk by allowing a broad flexibility for PMs to satisfy programmatic 
manufacturing risk reporting at MS C in DOD acquisition. The current direction towards 
a DOD production decision uses knowledge points to assess readiness but still largely 
operates as if it is a risk-based decision process contrary to the updated policy and DAG 
guidance. With a lack of manufacturing process definition and a lack of data from 
process controls on early fabrication of product in EMD it is unlikely that decision 
makers will have assurances for successful achievement of production rates and a desired 
production capability in PD. This contributes to the weakness observed by the GAO in 
the DOD production approval process. The May 2015 MRA Guidebook (version 2.3) 
states that 
the final stage of EMD is producing products that look and operate like 
they are production units from LRIP. These units need to be built on a 
pilot production line to adequately demonstrate the ability to migrate from 
EMD to LRIP. Without this realism it would be very difficult to obtain 
confidence that the production process will be able to meet cost, schedule, 




b. GAO Assesses Contractor Improvement Effort 
The GAO (2013) reported that contractors did improve their manufacturing 
readiness by demonstrating manufacturing product knowledge. However, a scorecard 
review, as published by the GAO, revealed there was a lack of process control and 
demonstration. The GAO use of “scorecards” failed to show that contractors complied 
with the GAO’s former recommendations for a statistical demonstration of production 
processes and controls across the programs the GAO reviewed. However, the GAO 
scorecards did not fully support Dodaro’s assessment (2013) with the findings that things 
were improving over prior years with respect to production maturity knowledge: “Many 
of the programs are capturing critical manufacturing knowledge prior to production, but 
their methods vary.”  
Fact checking the scorecards did not show evidence of the GAO’s assertion that 
programs improved over the prior years. What was observed is that the scorecards refute 
these claims—an example from AIM 9X Block II’s assessment (2013). The repudiation 
of “scorecard” success found that the data collected indicated that a contractor would be 
scored favorably by the GAO when audited but the contractor only planned to control the 
process at some future time (Figure 9).  
 




3. Problem Statement  
National defense is affected by any reduction in fleet readiness caused by poor 
production outcomes. The lack of a production capability demonstration at production 
start is one of those detractors. The DOD’s inability to address manufacturing capability 
issues reported by the GAO stems from policy inadequacies and a lack of a standard 
means to assure there is a readiness to produce.  
4. Research Questions 
The following research questions helped develop the study problem statement. A 
listing of specific research questions to be answered by this study follows: 
 How is production readiness defined in DOD acquisition? 
 How does the DOD manage manufacturing maturity and risk prior to MS 
C? 
 Why is there a lack of production readiness evidence for a decision at MS 
C? 
 Are non-DOD production approval processes more successful than 
comparable DOD processes and in what ways? 
 How can an alternative production approval process improve success in 
the DOD acquisition environment? 
C. PROJECT OBJECTIVES 
The deficiencies in DOD production outcomes, identified by the GAO’s Dodaro, 
provided a motivation for this research that intends to identify a more successful TTP not 
found in the current state of the DOD production approval process (2013). Coming at the 
problem space from many directions helped identify how to translate that discussion into 
a set of statements representing the study purpose: 
 Identify specific deficiencies and causal factors for poor production 




 Provide a SE approach to study alternative industry production approval 
processes as compared to DOD production approval process 
 Develop assessment criteria for an analysis of alternatives for a production 
approval process 
 Conduct analysis with discriminating measures of performance attributes 
 Report to stakeholders the findings and recommendations from this study  
 Identify potential future research to exploit the research conclusions 
D. SCOPE 
While the GAO pointed to three high-level factors contributing to poor production 
outcomes in DOD acquisition only manufacturing causal factors became the focus of this 
study. This study found that there had been little research addressing the acquisition 
consequences due to the lack of a standard approach to manufacturing development and 
demonstration. An examination of DOD manufacturing development, readiness and the 
production approval process created the domain of the manufacturing knowledge gap 
pointed out by the GAO (Table 1). 
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E. REPORT ORGANIZATION 
This report is organized in five chapters and an appendix. The remaining chapters 
are described as follows: 
Chapter II includes the background section, which addresses the study domain 
with respect to SE as a tool to analyze alternatives as applied to production approval 
processes contrasting DOD and non-DOD industries. The literature review section 
develops important elements of the study context related to production approval 
processes from the point of view of poor production outcome causality focusing the study 
on the issue of a lack of manufacturing knowledge.  
The study’s analytic approach is discussed in Chapter III. Lower-level details for 
measurable performance used in the AOA are developed. An operational view of the 
problem definition and role of stakeholders provides a construct that models the current 




six-step Systems Engineering Development Process (SEDP) is described and is applied to 
this study. 
Chapter IV discusses the study’s analytic approach using the measurable 
performance evaluation criteria developed. Commercial surveys investigated confirmed 
the benefits of the prescriptive quality standards. The study identified a preferred solution 
selection. 
Chapter V, the last chapter of the thesis, discusses the findings, summarizes the 
results, and provides recommendations. In addition, there is a brief discussion related to 
an opportunity for future study. Key enablers in support of a DOD process improvement 
are highlighted.  
The appendices support certain complex discussions found in the thesis. The 
items expand an understanding for practices that are typically unfamiliar to a DOD 
acquisition audience. A whitepaper is provided that treats the subject of a DOD technical 
warrant for use in any implementation of a standardized advanced product quality 









II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. BACKGROUND 
The background section is a discussion of general SE principals and then a careful 
development of the issues in the problem of poor production outcomes in manufacturing 
causality in DOD acquisition practices. This requires a development of the current-state 
of the DOD production approval practices and its shortcomings. Insight gained by 
studying the DOD process of manufacturing development provides a basis for evaluation 
for process improvement. 
B. SYSTEM ENGINEERING METHODS 
Systems engineering methods can provide a problem solving framework to 
examine issues surrounding the manufacturing knowledge gap that has resulted in poor 
production outcomes in DOD acquisition. In this study, an AOA assessment relied upon 
the selection of candidate alternatives and the development of assessment criteria that 
was used to study process improvement potential. A definition of systems engineering is 
a starting point that helped define the problem solving process of the study AOA. The 
development and application of the AOA model lead to the identification of a coherent 
SE approach aiding in the selection of a preferred solution. 
1. General Systems Engineering Definition 
The developing practice of SE and its body of knowledge includes the work of the 
International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE). Two popular definitions of SE 
help to provide a context for the use of SE for problem solving related to a process as 
significant as production approval in weapons procurement. According to INCOSE 
(2007), 
systems engineering is an interdisciplinary approach and means to enable 
the realization of successful systems. It focuses on defining customer 
needs and required functionality early in the development cycle, 
documenting requirements, and then proceeding with design synthesis and 
system validation while considering the complete problem. Systems 




customers with the goal of providing a quality product that meets the user 
needs (introduction). According to the Defense Acquisition Guidebook 
(DAG), 
systems engineering is an interdisciplinary approach encompassing the 
entire technical effort to evolve and verify an integrated and total life cycle 
balanced set of system, people, and process solutions that satisfy customer 
needs. Systems engineering is the integrating mechanism across the 
technical efforts related to the development, manufacturing, verification, 
deployment, operations, support, disposal of, and user training for systems 
and their life cycle processes. Systems engineering develops technical 
information to support the program management decision-making process. 
(OSD 2009, Chapter 4.0.2) 
From these definitions there is a need to apply the systems engineering discipline 
to manufacturing. A manufacturing process definition, like a product definition, can 
approach manufacturing development as a series of problem solving activities that 
identifies process functionality in relation to the satisfaction of product requirements. 
System Engineering works to evolve a preferred production solution that will create a 
product that reliably meets user needs. DOD weapons system acquisition does include 
manufacturing development and production approval process. Manufacturing engineering 
is therefore a concurrent partner with engineering development sharing a goal of 
delivering an affordable and producible engineered design.  
2. System Engineering Development Process (SEDP) 
The SEDP is a SE problem-solving approach focusing on system needs and 
continues toward an implementation of a supporting solution (Gibson, Scherer and 
Gibson 2007, 29–34). The SEDP approach defines an ideal (or normative) state related to 
a desired outcome. In production approval processes the normative state would be “good” 
production outcomes. Similarly, the SEDP approach assesses the as-is descriptive state of 
the DOD production approval process with the related undesired poor production outcome. 
An excellent graphical illustration, not intended to show details, captures visually the nature 
of the SEDP approach that considers product or process alternatives while moving the 






Figure 10.  System Engineering Design Process (SEDP).  
Source: Sullivan, Broullette and Joles (1998). 
In addition, the early engineering effort characterizes requirements and provides a 
problem definition in relation to the goals associated with that of an ideal solution. The 
process of establishing meaningful criteria used to assess the benefits of one alternative 
over another can involve a criteria ranking scheme allowing the analysis to discriminate 
between candidates. The resulting assessment uses numerical scoring comparing 
alternatives to support a recommendation towards a preferential option that best aligns 
with stakeholder needs and overall program goals.  
The SEDP can be further described as a sequential method of iterating around a 
solution space over variances in the factors of analysis moving engineering effort towards 
a preferred solution. See Table 2. Gibson notes that this approach can be controversial in 
its rating and ranking of metrics that are hard to characterize for comparison purposes 
(Gibson, Scherer and Gibson 2007, 33). Inhibiting issues may include political 
implications or a lack of sufficient background to substantiate the impact of factors 





Table 2.   Six Steps on How to Do a Systems Analysis 
Step 
SEDP Six Process Steps 1 Determine the (values) goals of the system 
2 Establish criteria for rating alternative candidates 
3 Identify or develop candidate alternative solutions 
4 Rank alternative candidates  
5 Iterate as necessary 
6 Action 
Adapted from Gibson, Scherer and. Gibson (2007).  
 
C. DOD ACQUISITION POLICY AND PROCESSES 
The lack of clear policy and guidance with respect to manufacturing development 
and demonstration in DOD weapons acquisition is a finding frequently identified in 
GAO’s annual reports to Congress (Dodaro 2013). This omission of clear guidance for 
manufacturing demonstration is an obstacle to realizing the benefits of best practices 
found in non-DOD industries.  
Prior to the Perry memo military standards were more prescriptive and included 
manufacturing requirements. The Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) conducts 
annual compliance reporting to assure military standards are only used when vital (OMB 
1998). The dramatic change brought on by the Perry memo still limits the use of how-to 
standards. Consider the policy statement from DOD Instruction No. 4120.24 (Breitenberg 
1999, 1):  
3. POLICY. It is DOD policy that:  
a. The Department of Defense shall maintain a single, integrated DSP 
[Document Standardization Program] to promote standardization of 
materiel, information technology, facilities, and engineering practices in 
accordance with Reference (c).  
b. Non-government standards shall be used in preference to developing 




section 12(d) of Public Law 104–113 (Reference (d)), unless they fall 
under one of the exceptions specified in section 12(d) of Reference (d).  
In the Perry approach, there is the reduced use of military standards in favor 
commercial consensus standards. An unintended consequence has been the loss of 
manufacturing requirements and know-how in DOD acquisition (policy and workforce). 
Today, there are no suitable consensus standards found in policy guidance. In addition, 
there is a legacy resistance to change current policy and practices given the established 
contractor-defined performance-based acquisition approach. The omission of 
manufacturing requirements in development programs with the removal of prescriptive 
military standards gave rise to the use of non-standard contractor developmental 
practices. The various contractor approaches to manufacturing development drives 
uncertainty into DOD oversight and inhibits improvement due to an omission of standard 
practices in manufacturing development and knowledge. 
The DOD has been slow to move towards defining a more objective treatment of 
manufacturing in development. For example, if reference is given to the DAU definition 
of “knowledge-based” acquisition then there should be a discussion and policy that 
supports producibility and affordability activities. Producibility is a design activity 
primarily concerned with making an item more affordable based on a design’s ease of 
manufacturing. This simple statement shows how interrelated designing and 
manufacturing are as partners in development. However, the DOD guidance documents 
do not standardize or require a prescriptive process of manufacturing development and 
demonstration. Manufacturing development lacks requirements specification in DOD 
acquisition and does not find itself as an equal development partner with product design 
and verification requirements.  
Generally, the DOD production readiness methods provide visibility to prime 
contractor behaviors with limitations on oversight into the supply network. There exists a 
contracting challenge in DOD acquisition to gain insight into the entire supply network. 
This was discussed in one GAO report pointing to the automotive sector’s QMS approach 




of this reference was a recommendation to apply the prescriptive automotive QMS to the 
entire supply network as a requirement (Schinasi 1996).  
Another difference illustrating contrast between the DOD and automotive OEMs 
is the automotive response to the global economic environment is uninhibited where the 
DOD prime contractors may be restrictive in global sourcing opportunities given obvious 
security issues in defense acquisition. Such examples as these can negatively impact 
acquisition outcomes, but they would be exceptions to the basic approach non-DOD 
manufacturers follow in there production approval processes. 
D. DOD PRODUCTION DECISION AND ACQUISITION POLICY 
The DOD acquisition guidance comes from four main policy documents and one 
guidebook used principally to define the acquisition approach for DOD weapons 
acquisition. Table 3 lists each of these key documents with a brief description of the 
associated sponsoring organization, document number, issuance date, and a comment 
derived to capture the purpose of the document. One significant finding from a review of 
these policy documents is that they describe a risk-based assessment and not a 
knowledge-based demonstration of production capability. As a result, programs proceed 
into production with significant production risk entering the PD phase. Poor production 
outcomes are the undesired consequence given the findings as reported by the GAO 
Dodaro (2013). The understanding conveyed is that the DOD process is deferring 
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“The JCIDS process provides 
organizations with the guidance and 
ability to validate Capabilities 
documents: ICD, CDD, CPD” (2) 




12-Feb-15 JCIDS Manual 
“This manual provides information 
regarding activities including mandatory 
training for personnel involved in the 
requirements processes, capability 
requirement portfolio management, 
identification of capability requirements 
and associated capability gaps, 
development of capability requirement 












“The Defense Acquisition system is 
intended to acquire quality products 
satisfying user needs that achieve 
mission capability at a fair and 






DOD Instruction - 
Operation of the 
Defense 
Acquisition System 
“The overarching management 
principles and mandatory policies that 
govern the Defense Acquisition 













“The Defense Acquisition Guidebook is 
intended to complement policy 
documents with discretionary best 
practice that should be tailored to 
program needs.” (DAU 2015b, 
ID=654219)  
 
1. Knowledge-Based Acquisition and Technical Authority 
 The DOD acquisition process includes program authorities that are the actors in a 
program’s management. Recent DOD acquisition reforms expressed in the DAS describe 
the intention to develop a weapons system using a stated paradigm shift in the supported 
SE approach from “risk-based” management to a “knowledge-based” acquisition 
strategy. Specifically, there is a discussion of a basic acquisition approach calling for a 
process capability assessment aligned to the new knowledge-based strategy. While noted 
in the DAG the knowledge-based approach is not operationalized in practice in DOD 




Positive acquisition outcomes require the use of a knowledge-based 
approach to product development that demonstrates high-levels of 
knowledge before significant commitments are made. In essence, 
knowledge supplants risk over time (chapter 4). 
An example brings some clarity to the difference between knowledge-based and 
risk-based approaches in SE. Manufacturing risk management is documented through a 
system engineering technical review (SETR) that is accomplished by the use of formal 
checklists that have been developed as guidance in support an acquisition milestone 
review. In the case of the MRL assessments, they are not used as entrance or exit 
requirements at acquisition milestones. Instead, DOD guidance describes manufacturing 
risk assed by the MRL simply as a status report.  
In addition to the MRL assessments the NAVY will often use the OSD SETR 
checklist tool to report overall program risk. The ARMY supports a gated SE review 
process with a checklist called the Product Assurance Risk Level (PARL) assessment. 
The ARMY Aviation & Missile Research, Development & Engineering Center maintains 
the PARL and is not a publicly accessible web product. In each case, manufacturing 
reviews consider the risk to manufacture and do not require any validation or 
demonstration of process capability knowledge prior to production decisions. These risk 
assessments do not follow the DAG paradigm shift to knowledge-based acquisition.  
The DAG downplays the advocacy of the MRL checklists within the policy 
documents and guidebooks questioning the value of a checklist’s ability to capture actual 
manufacturing program risk. This posture implies that the use of checklists is not 
adequate to the task of assuring process capability. If so, the DAG is correct in calling for 
a knowledge-based acquisition approach but does not actually integrate this process 
approach into best practices as found in the non-DOD industries. The DAG recognizes 
that a demonstration of process capability requires the use of statistical control from an 
assessment of key characteristics but the DOD approach lacks policy or standardization 
in production decisions acquisition. The DOD’s current risk assessment guidance 
describing manufacturing readiness is therefore favored over a knowledge-based 




Examining authorities involved in the assessment and approval process in DOD 
acquisition provides a potential construct for understanding the current state and any 
improvement potential in determination of DOD manufacturing readiness at MS C. The 
PM as a program authority is assigned the responsibility for executing a SE approach in 
accordance with acquisition policy and guidance. The PM is assisted by the appointment 
of a technical authority (TA). These authorities are two but not equal authorities. The 
manifestation of this is important to the production-readiness approach found in the 
automotive and regulatory industries. The non-DOD industries employ the use of a 
certified production readiness document called a Product Submission Warrant (PSW) 
assuring conformance to product and process requirements. The certified warrant is 
signed by a producer’s production authority as an industry best practice. The DOD does 
not have a similar certification process for production readiness for PD start.  
If the DOD TA structure supported a PSW type policy it would first require an 
accepted standard for production readiness demonstration. A white paper by Ireland 
(2017) provides a detailed discussion for such a TA approach. Ireland’s paper discusses 
how a certificated warrant for production readiness could be created by identifying a 
production readiness demonstration as a key performance parameter (Appendix E – DOD 
Technical Warrants). In brief, the organizational construct of a Technical Warrant Holder 
derives within a DOD system command (SYSCOM) workforce grouping the authority to 
manage a certification process to demonstrated production readiness. This workforce 
grouping represents a Competency-Aligned Organization that holds the recognized TA 
group. The certification warrant for production readiness is then the evidence and 
confirmation demonstrating production capability.  
Additional supporting justification for the PSW being a best practice can be found 
in the recently released Society of Automotive Engineer (SAE) standard, AS-9145 
Advanced Product Quality Planning (APQP) and Production Part Approval Process 
(PPAP) (SAE 2015). The warrant process provides a commitment by the producer that a 




2. Manufacturing Development and Consensus Standards 
Since 1996, the GAO had reported poor production outcomes and related this to a 
lack of a demonstrated process capability. At the time, the DOD acquisition system of 
1996 eliminated most military standards due to the post Perry memo period. Here, the 
force of law required the use of commercial consensus standards (Breitenberg 1996) and 
(Perry 1994). Consider the discussion taken from this 1996 GAO report: 
In December 1995, DOD began the Single Process Initiative, managed by: 
DCMC that allows contractors with military contracts to transition their 
quality management system from MIL-Q 9858A to their best practice, 
such as a quality management system based on ISO 9000, the basic 
commercial standard. The response to date has been slow; as of June 5, 
1996, 38 contractors had submitted proposals to change their quality 
management systems, 5 of which had been approved (15). 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology/GAO (1996) report stopped 
short of recommending the newly commercialized automotive family of standards over 
the ISO-9000 family of standards. The ISO-9000 QMS had been the accepted practice for 
contractors in DOD acquisition. The DOD acceptance of the aerospace standard (AS) 
AS-9100 was not a significant change due to the similarity in content to the ISO-9000 
QMS. The adoption of these QMS replaced the use of military standards for contractor 
quality practices that prior had many prescriptive manufacturing related requirements.  
Given the two types of QMS (prescriptive and non-prescriptive), one finds that 
the difference between ISO-9000 and AS-9100 is minor, but the difference between ISO-
9000 and QS-9000/ISO/TS-16949 was significant. The hallmark difference is found in 
the prescriptive methods of the automotive QS-9000 family of standards and guidebooks. 
A key tenant of the QS-9000 QMS was the application of a PSW or certification for 
product and process conformance verification. The PSW requirement included customer 
specific requirements such as statistical process control of the manufacturing processes. 
Dimensional requirements would be satisfied if a demonstration to a specified threshold 
performance was achieved utilizing the indices process performance index (Ppk) or 




production decision would overcome the patchwork of checklists that rely upon the risk-
based approach of the DOD.  
A significant operational difference found in the standard automotive OEM 
customer quality requirements was the passing of their common requirements on to lower 
tier suppliers as an enabling factor towards the success of the automotive sector. The 
enhanced set of automotive quality requirements included how-to manuals as guidance 
for APQP with a PPAP requirement (Table 4). As manufacturing processes developed 
under the guidance of APQP best practices the expectation of a supplier’s validation of 
product and production readiness completed by showing empirically any supplier’s 
readiness.  
Table 4.   Automotive Prescriptive Guidance and PPAP Quality Standards 
Global Automotive Standards 
For the OEM Supply Network 
Source G-Guide 
R - Required 
ISO/TS 16949 - Quality Management Systems  
Particular requirements for the application of ISO 9000:2008 for 





Advanced Product Quality Planning and Control Plan (APQP) 
The APQP and Control Plan is a reference manual that streamlines the 
entire quality & manufacturing process control approach in support of a 








 Design/Process Failure Mode & Effects Analysis (DFMEA/PFMEA) 
As part of the APQP family of reference manuals this guide answers 





Measurement Systems Analysis (MSA) 
This guide assists in the assessment of a measurement system that 





Statistical Process Control (SPC) 
This guide provides includes a wide range of statistical methods for 





Production Part Approval Process (PPAP) 
The supply network is required to comply with the requirements of the 
PPAP. Consistent quality demonstrated in an actual production run at 
production rates. The PPAP integrates production readiness including the 










E. PRODUCTION AND PROCESS CAPABILITY DISCUSSION 
In order to place into context the specialized understanding of production and 
process capability there is a need to draw from experience and research to develop a basic 
treatment on the subject. This understanding will help enable the reader to benefit from 
this study’s assessment method of critical criteria used in the AOA. This is of concern to 
this research because of the lack of guidance in DOD acquisition when contrasted to the 
more disciplined and robust manufacturing development practices present in non-DOD 
organizations (Schinasi 2002).  
This section discusses a context of production and process capability to show 
linkages to some of the manufacturing causal knowledge gaps that lead to poor 
production outcomes. Several definitions have been created to give additional clarity to 
the discussion on manufacturing environments and related contractor capabilities:  
 Manufacturing development - associates the development of a production 
environment to be used in the fabrication or production of an item. 
 Production capability - is used as a term that associates the totality of an 
organization’s ability to produce an item: man, machine, equipment, 
facilities and methods. 
 Process capability - is a term used that is specifically related to the ability 
of a given process to satisfy a design tolerance in a stochastic manner.   
 
A discussion on production capability examines manufacturing development as a 
producer’s ability to define, demonstrate and offer its ability to manufacture a product 
under a given operational strategy that gives that organization a position in their chosen 
industrial market place. The maturity of a manufacturing development that defines the 
fabrication of a given product is related to the manufacturing planning needed to process 
and demonstrate that ability to produce at a desired production rate. Each item produced 
under this manufacturing development is to meet that item’s design requirements. The 
evidence that a manufacturing process is production capable is the knowledge-based 




It is the DOD and non-DOD production approval processes that can be studied for 
their approach to measure a new production capability and underlying process capability. 
The pre-production approval results are used to show the importance and impact of 
production capability and therefore readiness at production start.  
When process capability knowledge is lacking then poor outcomes may occur as 
decisions are made without sufficient evidence of production or process capability. When 
a production decision is primarily based on a functional qualification, as in DOD 
production readiness decisions, there is a manufacturing knowledge gap. The DOD 
approach to manufacturing development may show production feasibility from early 
fabrication experience but leave decision makers uninformed about process capability. 
Most non-DOD industries favor a manufacturing development similar to the approach in 
the APQP guidance standards published by the AIAG culminating in a demonstration of 
their production system (AIAG 2008a). 
1. What Is Process Capability? 
An item’s technical performance qualification is no guarantee that the developed 
manufacturing process used to fabricate that item is capable. A process that is required to 
manufacture an item has its own process-dependent performance measures to substantiate 
that the there is a capable process. When a qualified item’s functional performance meets 
requirements it cannot confirm that the same item was made under manufacturing process 
that is stable and in control. For instance, an individual process step can have a high-
degree of part-to-part variation due to equipment, operators, instructions, and 
measurements. When a fabricated part is shown to meet requirements inference cannot be 
made as to its underlying production environment’s capability.  
From a designer’s view, there is a technical data package with drawings that 
seldom are inclusive of any specific description regarding how that item is fabricated. 
The producibility aspects of a design are beyond the given design feature specified. 
Consider a hole specified on a drawing with its dimensions and tolerance that is sufficient 
to communicate a designer’s intent. However, if one wanted to create that hole they could 




Whether drilling, stamping or a water jet fabrication method is chosen it is vitally 
important to assure manufacturing method translates into a capable process. For example, 
water pressure could vary at the time of processing or the water jet’s effective size may 
vary with age so resulting features may be too large or off-center - all of which impact 
precision and accuracy to the design intent. Process capability studies are the typical way 
to provide confidence that a given fabrication method of a design feature would be 
producible, affordable and process capable. These processes should be fully designed and 
verified by MS C in DOD acquisition as they are in non-DOD counterparts as a pre-
production demonstration requirement.  
In another case, manufacturing planning and execution for any process step under 
some level of process control must involve suitable tools and fixtures that meet the 
quantity and quality challenges. Functional features that are difficult to measure at the 
point of fabrication may rely upon a downstream process functional test or an upstream 
process characteristic validation.  
For example, a fastener is required to reach a certain torque with the intent to 
assure, indirectly, a clamp load that engineering defines. If the clamp load characteristic 
is critical, then certain in-process features may be critical to the process for controlling 
fastened torque. A process action may define a critical characteristic for fastener position 
(Soft start, thread engagement and angle) during torque achievement in-station. This 
process may need to be inspected by a functional downstream test using a wrench that 
measures breakaway torque. Indirect measurement studies can support critical product 
characteristics defined as supporting process tolerances in fabrication. Items made as 
manufacturing representative prototypes or early production may not have adequate 
production controls applied in the manufacturing processes in DOD acquisition in the 
EMD phase. The relationship of functional performance and part fabrication controls is 
fundamental in achieving production and process capability. This is why product 
qualification testing cannot substantiate process qualification directly.  
The need to identify and measure critical characteristics in the process under 
manufacturing control is a best practice in non-DOD production organizations as pointed 




demonstrate process stability, homogeneity and measurable achievement of product 
performance at a production demand rate. Statistical Process Control (SPC) performance 
can show a stable process exists demonstrating that parts are in conformance with design 
tolerances and can be correlated to product performance. Statistical Process Control 
reveals the degree of process capability and assures part-to-part variation is acceptable to 
a threshold quality level and may show an as-built item meets design performance.  
2. Process Capability Measurement 
In any manufacturing development process, capability determination may include 
the identification of some risk and uncertainty related to late design changes anticipated 
from early test results and production methods used in qualification. Assessing a 
production readiness of an item solely upon a risk-based PRR technical review falls short 
when trying to establish a production maturity level. This approach is insufficient in 
contrast to the evidence of compliance that assesses part-to-part variation in a 
demonstration of process capability.  
In the DOD acquisition guidance, a contractor’s production plans may be 
complete but not realized in EMD where manufacturing development should complete. 
The DAS allows manufacturing development to continue during LRIP. This can be up to 
ten percent of a production order and be repeated. Therefore, production capability is not 
known and is a risk at the end of EMD. This would be unacceptable and woefully 
incomplete in most non-DOD industries and would not be allowed in regulatory industry 
environments. This lack of assessing actual production knowledge is a typical omission 
in the government readiness assessments.  
Non-DOD industries follow standard formulas to measure process capability. A 
manufacturing process can be addressed by the use of Cpk defined in the AIAG’s SPC 
reference manual (AIAG 2005). These capability indices are to verify the ability of a 
process to meet design tolerance requirements in a repeatable manner and at production 
rates. These indices can be correlated to measures of non-conformance such as defects 
per thousand produced. The probability of violating design tolerances are set as threshold 




Manufacturing assessments are needed as on-going measures of process 
capability. The use of SPC under a given process control can signal adverse trends with 
excessive part-to-part variation that would lead to a non-conformance condition. Active 
capability assessments allow an ability to prevent non-conformances by in-station 
adjustments preserving process standards. When part tolerance limits are established and 
measurement systems are suitable then this approach is an industrial best practice. Yang 
discusses the approach to automation control characteristics in quality planning in 
computer-aided design and relies on the following basic steps (Yang 2007, 30): 
Here are the steps to follow when implementing SPC: 
 Take periodic samples from process 
 Plot sample points on control chart 
 Determine if process is within limits 
 Prevent quality problems 
While Yang’s research developed a systematic approach to analyze the tolerance 
stack-up for complex multi-spec processes, his outline of action is central to using a 
knowledge-based QMS to assure quality targets are achieved. Process capability viewed 
through the analytics of Cpk and Ppk measures are related to on-going process capability 
verification. The use of quality metrics, such as Cpk and Ppk, help to verify process 
control achievement of design tolerances and avoids adverse product effects from process 
variation. These measures defined and validated early in support of production approval 
would give support to continuous improvement initiatives in LRIP and FRP rather than 
continuing uncertain manufacturing development capability. This would pull back fleet 
readiness risk into manufacturing development prior to MS C.  
It is important to note how the GAO advocated for this practice of calculating 
process control indices. The GAO discussed best practices that included measurement of 
defect expectation to avoid adverse findings on DOD acquisition of weapon systems. The 
GAO found recently that DOD acquisition practices still did not confirm production 




To assess production maturity, we asked program officials to identify the 
number of critical manufacturing processes and, where available, to 
quantify the extent of statistical control achieved for those processes as a 
part of our data-collection instrument. In most cases, we did not verify or 
validate the information provided by the program office. We clarified the 
number of critical manufacturing processes and the percentage of 
statistical process control where information existed that raised concerns. 
We used a standard called the process capability index, a process-
performance measurement that quantifies how closely a process is running 
to its specification limits. The index can be translated into an expected 
product defect rate, and we have found it to be a best practice (159). 
3. Measurement System Analysis 
Dimensional control in a manufacturing process requires an understanding of the 
associated measurement systems that are used to confirm a manufactured item meets a 
given design feature’s specified engineering tolerance. Common within a DOD 
contractor’s production facility are the inclusion of test and measurement devices to show 
fabrication and assembly processes are satisfying functional design requirements. The 
process capability to be demonstrated and maintained requires a suitable calibrated test 
and measurement system’s precision and accuracy ─ meaning that the gage or measuring 
device’s error is typically designed around a 10:1 ratio with the error of measurement 
being at most 10% of the tolerance of interest as a best practice (AIAG 2010). The ability 
to measure and replicate a manufacturing process part after part says more about a 
manufacturing process capability than a qualification-only approach. Production process 
capability measures demonstrate the confidence or likelihood that a production process 
will sustain its ability to make product that meets product functional requirements.  
One experience in a measurement study considered a relationship between a 
measurable design feature and its measuring device. That measuring device was a 
calibrated tape measure. The tape measure had graduated markings of measurement every 
1/32nd inch. As a rule of thumb the error of measurement of a trained operator has an 
accuracy of ½ the marked division. When the process called for a measurement of 1/32nd 
inch tolerance this meant every part would have to measure nominal to the center of a 
design tolerance with no margin. Here, the error of measurement (+/- 1/64th inch) used 




Stochastically the probability of being nominal is zero and therefore every part was non-
conforming. 
4. Process Definition 
In addition to the quantitative aspects of a process capability, there is also the 
fidelity of the manufacturing development definition that ultimately defines the 
production capability of an organization including enabling structures listed: 
 manufacturing plans  
 work instructions 
 production methods 
 production machines 
 production tooling 
 test equipment 
 facilities 
These items are all a part of the production capability context prior to one part 
being ready to build under the challenge of production. These items are integral to the 
homogeneity of process relied upon prior to understanding if a functioning part is from a 
well-defined and well-behaved production process under process control (AIAG 2005).  
5. Advanced Product Quality Planning and Risk 
The advanced product quality planning process is directly related to the 
automotive QMS and concerns itself with the development of product and production 
capability. APQP has four core product and manufacturing development strategies and 
are referenced in Table 4. The APQP guidance is standard practice in most non-DOD 
industries and includes the definition manufacturing knowledge at production start not 
found in DOD practices. For example, the DOD use of the MRL assessment does not 




with respect to demonstrating critical characteristics from an actual production line when 
completing EMD at MS C.  
On a scale of one (not ready) to ten (experienced), the MRL of 8 is the maturity 
level desired at the end of EMD (OSD 2012). MRL practitioners find that there is a 
limitation in the use of the MRL preset questions when interrogating a manufacturing 
process as to its maturity level. The MRL approach is not necessarily able to identify 
project-specific risks.  
A process study serves to identify any associated risk or non-conformance 
potential in a manufacturing process which might otherwise go undetected. In contrast, 
trying to document manufacturing risk, from the interrogation approach of the MRL 
assessment, lacks the specificity to address a given production or process capability. The 
MRL level associated with a production capable process is set at MRL 9 where process 
controls would be evaluated. In the DOD assessment of manufacturing maturity an MRL 
of 9 is not required until prior to FRP. In contrast, if a non-DOD industry would apply the 
MRL process it would have an MRL goal of 10 with process improvement behaviors at 
production start. See “Appendix M. MRL Levels 6 to 10” and (OSD 2015).  
A non-DOD manufacturing development best practice uses a process study 
approach to assess specific manufacturing risk that results in the identification of a 
potential need for a process control as a mitigation of process risk. One such approach is 
the Process Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (PFMEA) identified in the automotive 
APQP (AIAG 2008b). Analyzing and addressing a manufacturing process for potential 
ways a production process might fail is a robust study into good production process 
analysis and should be completed prior to production start and is not a typical tool used in 
DOD acquisition.  
The design related risk assessment is found in the application of the Design 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (DFMEA) and the PFMEA is for the process failure 
mode assessment (AIAG 2008b, AIAG 1992). According to the AIAG’s FMEA manual, 
the DFMEA is conducted ahead of the PFMEA to identify design risk. Design risk found 




different materials) or in considering a manufacturing control if design tolerance margin 
is small in proportion to desired process capability. 
The power of the PFMEA analysis is in its ability to identify potential ways a 
specific process may fail and then to capture actionable process changes that may assure 
a part processed under statistical control meets requirements (AIAG 2008b). The PFMEA 
is a preferred non-DOD best practice for identifying manufacturing risk and utilizes three 
risk parameters. Risk assessed in this way identifies potential non-conformance concerns 
by severity, occurrence and detection risk factors. Here, a finding of risk allows an 
evaluation for acceptance, mitigation or elimination of potential failure modes at the root 
cause level early in manufacturing development towards a robust manufacturing process.  
Another core strategy found the AIAG’s APQP is the use of SPC. This would be 
the in-process measurements that are to be tracked and stochastically evaluated for trends 
that might threaten achievement of a characteristic of design due to a manufacturing 
process or methods variability. A fourth core APQP strategy is the Measurement System 
Analysis (MSA) process that evaluates the underlying measurement system used in 
manufacturing whether special test equipment or gages and tools. A key tenet of any 
MSA is a calibration process affirming equipment accuracy is maintained to assure a 
process measurement tool is calibrated to known standards. In non-DOD industries it is a 
best practice to use the error of measurement to amend process acceptance criteria to be 
more restrictive than a design tolerance—a guard band. This adjustment is rarely used by 
contractors in DOD programs and without this guidance quality defects escape the 
factory unlike non-DOD industries that guard band measurement error.  
F. PRODUCTION APPROVAL PROCESSES 
Non-DOD organizations interviewed by the GAO had industrial sector influences 
that guided organizational use of specific QMS with an associated production approval 
practice. Organizations followed a product development strategy according to their 
associated OEM or related regulatory agency with their unique requirements. An 
organization’s industrial sector provided the larger influence that guided the type of QMS 




Applying the selection filter of Table 5 there are three alternate production 
approval processes that emerge for study as industrial sectors. These alternatives are 
grouped into the industrial sectors governed by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the automotive industry. These three, non-
DOD industrial sectors were determined to be suitable alternatives because of scale and 
product complexity for comparison to the DOD acquisition practices.  
Table 5.   Identification of Alternate Production Approval Processes 
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While there are examples of DOD contractors who applied the automotive type 
QMS to their supply network, it is rare. United Technologies Corporation (UTC) is one 
example. The history of UTC included an automotive division’s influence observed by 
the application by Sikorsky (Appendix L - Links to Quality Practices).  
Table 6 illustrates the three industrial sectors rough scaling of business metrics 
and associated financial data. A gross comparison revealed each industry’s economic 
statistics in terms of 1) number of employees; and 2) revenue (Department of Commerce 
2015a; Department of Commerce 2015b; Ibisworld 2015). The scalable comparison of 
economic factors showed that each industry sector had definable quality systems. The 
non-DOD industries studied included a certification process as part of their production 




Table 6.   Rough Scaling of Industry Sectors 
  
With the assumption that better production outcomes in non-DOD industries 
resulted from the use of their best practices the reader is left asking what differentiated 
these processes from DOD production approval practices? A review of these non-DOD 
QMS applications found that they all used a more prescriptive type of QMS. The QMS 
groupings provided the insight needed to conduct the AOA which appears in detail in 
chapter III of this report. This supports why a quality management system’s 
characteristics and benefits need to be explored in this study. The GAO report (2010) 
demonstrates the direction the DOD selected. 
The DOD’s response to the GAO report of 2010, found in “Appendix G,” did not 
satisfy the GAO’s hopes that a consistent or standard approach might emerge in DOD 
production approval with a demonstration, including statistical process control (SPC) 
(Sullivan 2010). Capturing the key response from the DOD memo:  
While the Department [DOD] notes that all manufacturing processes do 
not warrant the same level of process capability and control, appropriate 
levels of control are certainly warranted on a case by case basis (66).  
and 
The Department [DOD] will examine strengthening the manufacturing 
readiness criteria related to process capability and control of critical 
components and/or interfaces prior to the MS C low rate initial production 
decision. However, program offices and contractors should continue to 
have the latitude to jointly agree on the targets and specific process control 
demonstrations required on the pilot production line during the 
Engineering and Manufacturing Development to ensure success (66). 
Direct Billions Billions
Employees Revenue Export
Commercial Aerospace 500,000 $216 $118
Automotive Industry 786,000 $225 $75
Medical Devices 411,000 $40
DOD - three largest Contractors 400,000 $100
Sector
Rough Scaling of Industry Sectors




G. PRODUCTION APPROVAL PROCESS ATTRIBUTES 
Given the comparative groupings of the FAA, FDA and the auto industry, the 
next goal of the study focused on the development of an analysis tool to differentiate 
between alternate production approval processes. A review of each industrial sector’s 
approach to production approval practices provided a producer’s respective 
manufacturing development knowledge and attributes of each production readiness 
decision process.  
The comparative study criteria developed performance and cost benefits. A 
comparison of each industrial sector, selected for study, followed a discoverable and 
formal production approval process. The comparison to the DOD production readiness 
process used high-level criteria developed from the industrial best practices. A summary 
categorizing production process characteristics as best practice attributes are presented in 
Table 7 as observed in the researcher’s commercial experience. 
Each statement found in Table 7 is a best practice attribute that expresses a robust 
matured practice. For example, there is a considerable amount of professional effort in 
developing consensus standards and then to deploy them throughout an entire industrial 
sector supply network. It is not unusual for a commercial standard to take several years to 
gain consensus and then another decade to maintain and discover its effectiveness.  
Table 7.   Input and Output Best Practice Attributes 
 
 
1        Common engineering language 
2        Common quality standards
3         Common customer requirements
4         Third party compliance to quality system standards
5         Prescriptive advanced quality planning practices 
6 Quality requirements flowed to the entire supply network
7        Certification of demonstrated capability prior to production
1         Quality system administrative efficiencies
2   Knowledge-based demonstration of manufacturing capability
3         Measurable system of quality metrics for user satisfaction
4         Improved product reliability and durability 











H. QUALITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (QMS) 
Quality management system standards were found to influence an organization’s 
effectiveness as a manufacturer. Basic production capability depended upon an 
organizational approach to production approval. The two basic types of QMS 
applications included the ISO-9000 family of standards and the Automotive Industry 
Action Group (AIAG) QMS QS-9000 family of standards. Depending on which QMS an 
organization followed, there were different quality outcomes observed (ISO 2008; AIAG 
2006).  
The ISO-9000 related standards remain the core of all QMS in the study. A QMS 
serves as an industry best practice employed by organizations as an assurance to 
customers that their systems and processes followed good management principles and 
quality practices that influence product and service results. The QS-9000’s release 
followed closely after the publication of the ISO-9000 standards but added customer 
specific guidance documents requiring prescriptive requirements directed at the 
automotive industry OEM supply chain.  
The QS-9000 family of standards unified a myriad of automotive OEM standards 
used by the entire automotive supply base (Bandyopadhyay 1996, 7, 12). Bandyopadhyay 
observed that registering compliance to the earlier released ISO-9000 family of standards 
was not satisfactory for the automotive OEMs and the additional requirements of the auto 
industry that contributed to higher quality production outcomes.  
The AIAG consortium, formed by the American automotive OEMs, enabled and 
managed the newer enhanced quality standards of the QS-9000. As reported by 
Bandyopadhyay, the supply network implementation of the unified OEM automotive 
approach was facilitated by the AIAG assisting in educating, enabling and guiding 
suppliers as to the necessary means to have a common production approval process.  
The supply base QMS implementation relied upon AIAG training and third party 
compliance registration. The instrumental role of the AIAG and the formulation of 




OEMs globally and are practiced by the entire supply chain and avoiding multiple QMS 
requirements. See Appendix F..  
A review of the automotive-unique requirements distinguished the two QMS 
standards (ISO-9000 and QS-9000) as materially different. The automotive enhanced 
quality standards (QS-9000) required many prescriptive OEM quality practices and how 
to conduct a demonstration. Process capability required the identification of critical 
characteristics during their disciplined process development. The additional requirements 
were essential to confirm production readiness through a production capability 
demonstration prior to a production decision. The automotive QS-9000 standards 
transferred control from the AIAG to the SAE and preserved the automotive OEM 
customer specific requirements to reflect the global supply base managed by ISO. This 
was done in collaboration with an international automotive taskforce (AIAG 2006). The 
ISO rebranding of the QS-9000 QMS used the TS prefix designation now rendered as 
ISO/TS-16949. This allowed the ISO construct to include detailed customer specific 
requirements of a prescriptive nature.  
After a decade of use, the ISO-9000 QMS type was assessed by a survey 
conducted by McGraw-Hill in 1999 (Naveh, Marcus and Koo Moon 1999). Similarly, for 
the QS-9000 QMS type there were two similar surveys by the AIAG and the American 
Society of Quality (ASQ) (AIAG/ASQ 1997) and (AIAG 1998). The ISO-9000 
standards, absent of prescriptive practices, served as a management system of quality 
related policy statements that identified manufacturing best practices. The DOD version 
of ISO-9000 was the AS-9000 QMS. The more prescriptive QS-9000 standards with a 
certification of production demonstration represented the evidentiary difference between 
standards (SAE 2009). Discussion on the results of the ASQ/AIAG QS-9000 QMS and 
McGraw-Hill ISO-9000 QMS application surveys are in the AOA section, IV.B.  
There was a finding of ineffectiveness showing little improvement when adopting 
the QMS from the ISO-9000 series. In contrast, the QS-9000 series of prescriptive 
standards showed significant improvement in a producer’s business and quality. The 




the study findings. The QMS type used and its impact on quality were highly correlated 
in each survey due to the numerous respondents.  
The application of a QMS and how oversight is applied in DOD weapon systems 
acquisition follows policy level guidance where the various SYSCOMs flow 
requirements to acquisition teams. Consider the AS version of the ISO 9000 QMS (AS-
9100) (SAE 2009). The Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) endorsed the AS-9100 QMS in 
SECNAVINST 5000.2D/E (“Appendix D”). 
The DOD acquisition leads can select higher level quality standards such as a 
QMS for compliance to a contractor’s conduct of an engineering development and 
execution of a production system. Acquisition teams have some guidance as to which 
consensus standards can be levied against a contract. The usage of a particular QMS, 
such as the ISO/TS-16949 reference within the CFR, would be to provide a more 
prescriptive set of requirements to weapons contracting. The GAO report (1996), 
discussed the use of the ISO/TS-16949 quality standard as a supplement to ISO-9000 but 
no finding of its use has been shown in subsequent GAO reports (Schinasi 1996, 13).  
The CFR called out the need for each agency desiring to specify a higher quality 
standard to create a procedure to assess when such a need would exist. Unfortunately, the 
DOD acquisition legacy and policies only guide program teams to follow performance-
based acquisition favoring a contractor’s individual approach. Additionally, DOD 
acquisition policy and guidance does not indicate when to use the enhanced QMS like 
ISO/TS-16949 or the AS-9100 D release that will likely be required after 2018 that also 
includes the AS-9145 APQP and PPAP manufacturing development and quality 
production approval standard in the overall QMS family. 
While it is not found in any guidance, the current AS-9100 revision C QMS does 
allow for a customer’s special or discretionary requirements (Table 8). Invoking the 
special requirements clause allows regulatory requirements to be defined to satisfy 
supplementary agency requirements to be levied by the FAA and the FDA. The DOD 
does not engage on this level of requirements as a standard practice or even selectively. 




Non-DOD supplier contracting relationships develop differently and more directly 
defining the relation between a prime and a subcontractor (SAE 2009). A summary of 
AS-9100, clause 3.2, given by the Long Island chapter of ASQ has discretionary 
language almost identical to that shown in the instruction given by the Navy policy 
guidelines but still leans toward contractor discretion (ASQLONGISLAND 2015). 
Table 8.   AS-9100 C: 2008 Clause 3.2 – Special Requirements  
 
Adapted from American Society of Quality - Long Island Division, (2015). 
 
I. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Reviews of certain DOD policy documents, academic publications, technical 
publications and oversight reports help identify the current state of DOD acquisition 
practice. This information confirms the manufacturing knowledge gaps identified by the 
GAO as deficiencies and causal factors for poor production outcomes. This literature 
review provides sufficient detail with respect to establishing the alternate process 
knowledge to build the development of the AOA approach. Observations concerning 
alternative production approval processes established a solid foundation for process 
comparison in the AOA. Collectively, this information provided the development of the 
study focus and the process performance factors for the AOA assessment.  
There are three factors of poor production outcomes assessed in the literature 
review and are taken from Figure 1 identifying the reason for the study focus on lack or 
manufacturing knowledge:  
3.2 Special Requirements Insight   
Those requirements identified by the customer, or 
determined by the organization, which have high risks to 
being achieved, thus requiring their inclusion in the risk 
management process. Factors used in the determination of 
special requirements include product or process complexity, 
past experience and product or process maturity. Examples 
of special requirements include performance requirements
imposed by the customer that are at the limit of the 
industry’s capability, or requirements determined by the
organization to be at the limit of its technical or process
capabilities.
Why:
 Ensure that such requirements are systematically
addressed and linked to risk management activities by
the organization
Impact:
A formal approach to identifying special requirements




1. Lack of Technical Readiness  
a. Technical Readiness in the TMRR Phase 
Technology knowledge gaps and the value of technology readiness in DOD 
acquisition are explored in a thesis by Coble et al. (2014). This work addressed a need to 
identify a better modeling approach in requirements definition during the Technical 
Maturity and Risk Reduction (TMRR) phase. The thesis study team reported an improved 
requirements modeling approach related to prototyping. The authors believed that 
improved modeling of requirements and the prototyping process would help more 
accurate and timely facilitation of technology.  
Here, Coble et al.’s report failed to identify manufacturing technology knowledge 
gaps as being of any concern during the TMRR phase. The work by Coble’s team is part 
of a large body of published work focusing on technological maturity in DOD 
acquisition. The omission of manufacturing development in Coble’s team thesis is similar 
to other research ignoring manufacturing causality on poor production outcomes.  
b. A Broad Meta Study Review on Technical Readiness  
The technical report by Azizian, Sarkani and Mazzuchi (2009), “A 
Comprehensive Review and Analysis of Maturity Assessment Approaches for Improved 
Decision Support to Achieve Efficient Defense Acquisition,” discussed the need to 
address poor production outcomes of major weapon system programs. Azizian, Sarkani 
and Mazzuchi’s article cited many of the same GAO reports referenced in this study with 
the same causal issues for poor production outcomes. They specifically mention all three 
of the GAO causal factors (including manufacturing knowledge gaps) but only reported 
on issues related to short comings of technological maturity. This team joins other 
researchers omitting the manufacturing causal factor.  
 According to Azizian, Sarkani and Mazzuchi, there exists confusion in the 
literature with respect to saying a technology is mature or if a technology possesses a 
readiness to the extent that they use the terms interchangeably. This researcher does not 
agree with the Azizian team’s interchangeability of terms. In studying production 




viewed as a process and readiness is the assessment of maturity at a point in time against 
a goal or standard. The confusion can be resolved by the context given in the respective 
Technical Readiness Level (TRL) and MRL guidebooks. A given “readiness” level is the 
result of using the related maturity assessment process asking progressive questions 
interrogating a product’s performance or a production environment’s definition.  
c. Technical Readiness Contrasted with Manufacturing Readiness 
A review of the DOD acquisition policy and guidance documents identified the 
DOD instruction, DODI 5000.02, which describes detailed acquisition policy 
requirements (USD[AT&L] 2015). These DOD policy documents deal objectively with 
technology readiness in acquisition. The JCIDS manual states that for any critical 
technology element identified, the technical maturity measurement must satisfy a TRL 6 
prior to entry to the EMD phase (JCS 2015b). The JCIDS manual shows that technology 
maturation is to be determined by a demonstration of a TRL requirement (JCS 2015b); 
(USD[AT&L] 2015). 
There is no complementary MRL readiness level required as a milestone entrance 
or exit requirement. As a measure of risk, the MRL would be reported to the MDA only 
if the PM considered that risk significant. The absence of a complimentary manufacturing 
readiness requirement demonstration inhibits knowing if a program is ready to proceed 
from EMD to the PD phase. A production environment is the focus of the desired MRL 
level and is not based on a production environment’s execution under production control. 
The MRL guidebook actually de-emphasizes the MRL “number” in favor of a maturity 
assessment and any plan to mature any discovery of shortcomings (OSD 2012). 
Therefore, there is a lack of manufacturing readiness knowledge by DOD guidance.  
2. Lack of Design Stability 
The DOD acquisition policy reformers released DOD 5000.02 in 2008 wherein a 
formal Preliminary Design Review (PDR) occurs prior to Milestone B at the end of the 
TMRR phase. See Figure 2 (USD[AT&L] 2008). The DOD acquisition process, as 
amended in 2008, inserted the PDR technical review into the earlier TMRR phase instead 




Therefore, a design definition in EMD is now definable in TMRR to assure a 
more stable PDR product definition in the build-to configuration with its allocated 
baseline realized prior to EMD. At this point, a contractor will specify a design level that 
defines the PDR’s allocated baseline and apply configuration management for the 
associated item(s) developed. Having configuration management and a design definition 
from a successful PDR in the TMRR phase is discussed as addressing the GAO concern 
related to design-instability by the Office of the DODR&E, Systems Engineering 
Department (Dahmann and Kelley 2009).  
While the Dahmann and Kelley paper offered guidance on the approach used by 
system engineers during development phases the guidance offered failed to establish an 
approach with respect to manufacturing even though the manufacturing competency 
belongs within the domain of SE. There is no mention given to the establishment of 
manufacturing requirements or capabilities in the early phases leading to EMD or exiting 
from EMD to enter PD start.  
There is ample evidence in the published literature and the current DAS showing 
that the two causal factors identified by the GAO for poor production outcomes related to 
technological readiness and design-instability have been addressed. Therefore, current 
acquisition policy, in general, closed two of the three deficiencies advocated by the GAO 
reports as related to the causality of poor production outcomes after MS C. On the other 
hand, the DOD acquisition reformers have not shown improvement over the prior 
policies with respect to manufacturing in DOD acquisition (JCS 2008); (USD[AT&L] 
2013); (JCS 2015a); (JCS 2015b) and (USD[AT&L] 2015).  
3. Lack of Manufacturing Knowledge 
This section examines various selections of the DAS guidance and provides a 
detailed look at the treatment of the production approval processes in DOD acquisition. 
One key observation is that there are no standards that require a demonstration of 
statistical control of a manufacturing process prior to MS C. Consider the DOD 
acquisition manufacturing policy guidance in the JCIDS manual that states that the CPD 




in accordance with the Joint Service/Industry MRL Working Group’s published MRL 
Deskbook (OSD 2012). The review of the 2015 JCIDS manual also identifies the need 
for manufacturing knowledge to support a production decision. In addition, it should be 
noted that the MRL Deskbook identifies itself as a best practice and not a DOD 
requirement in conflict with the 5000.02 instruction calling for its use in weapons 
acquisition as a requirement (OSD 2012, i) and (OSD 2015, i).  
The discussion that follows considers selections of the DAS taken from certain 
policy documents with the relevant part to this thesis giving a brief assessment:  
a. Reference Appendix E Selections from DOD Acquisition Policy: Item 4 
Selection 1, Selection 2 and Selection 3 
Guidance from the DODI 5000.02 includes a call to have an effective 
demonstration of production capability. However, when more detail in this requirement is 
presented in the instructions there is a demotion from a rigor associated with a 
demonstration to a discussion on risk to support CPD reporting requirements to satisfy an 
MDA. These passages advocate for a manufacturing demonstration at the end of EMD 
and also prior to FRP. The need for a manufacturing demonstration at the end of EMD is 
subsequently deconstructed from a knowledge-based demonstration of process control to 
a risk assessment process not requiring actual evidence of production process capability. 
b. Reference Appendix E Selections from DOD Acquisition Policy: Item 4 
Selection 4 
When contrasting the manufacturing demonstration and product qualification 
required for reporting technological and performance requirements at the end of EMD 
one finds that the manufacturing demonstration does not occur and is deferred until after 
LRIP instead of being verified as an exit requirement for EMD. Functionally defined 
technical requirements appear in various detailed programmatic documents such as the 
TEMP, statements of work or specification documents and lists of performance based 
requirements to be demonstrated. These functional requirements for demonstration and 
qualification prior to production decision are only product based and not process based. 




risk to the contractor’s manufacturing plan. Any expectation for a production capability 
demonstration does not factor into DOD acquisition at MS C. 
The character “M” found in the abbreviation EMD is to represent a program’s 
manufacturing development as a partner of design. When comparing non-DOD 
development the M is properly represented with respect to assessing manufacturing 
design and development with a verification and demonstration. DOD acquisition waits to 
assess production capability as a post-production consideration at the PCA event 
(USD[AT&L] 2015, 29). 
One rationale behind the omission of a manufacturing demonstration in DOD 
acquisition is by mistakenly relying upon functional product qualification to substitute 
product performance and manufacturing capability. In a non-DOD production approval 
demonstration there is a requirement to show verification from a controlled and defined 
production environment, at a production rate, from production tooling, with product built 
under SPC (AIAG 2005).  
In addition, the DOD policy documents do not engage the supplier network to 
assure that the government’s interest in being production ready at MS C. In this case, a 
supplier’s part only requires a functional qualification. The flow down requirement to 
show that manufacturing processes will be under statistical control in the supply base is 
significant and different than accepting a part’s qualification results as representing the 
capability of the manufacturing process. Therefore, any program that fails to secure 
production capability knowledge at production commitment has a built-in manufacturing 
knowledge gap that is a causal condition for poor production outcomes. 
The DAS higher-level guidance flows down in DOD acquisition definition to the 
SYSCOMs. Individually, SYSCOMs may structure a responsive instruction to achieve 
production readiness knowledge. One SYSCOM instruction directed attention to a 
functional performance demonstration and production process readiness and planning 
asking for “a satisfactory basis” for determining readiness as found in the Naval Air 





c. Reference Appendix E Selections from DOD Acquisition Policy: Item 4 
Selection 5 
In the current NAVAIRINST 4355.19E there is far less guidance given with 
respect to manufacturing readiness and removes any notion of an objective basis for 
proceeding to LRIP (NAVAIR 2015). Clearly, the writers of the D revision anticipated 
some basis of satisfaction to be determined but did not clearly define the basis or require 
an objective demonstration or certification of production readiness as recommended by 
the NDIA in 2010. Between revisions of the instruction from D to E, there is a scaled 
down PRR criteria offered by the SYSCOM instruction NAVAIRINST 4355.19E 
(NAVAIR 2015). 
d. Reference Appendix E Selections from DOD Acquisition Policy: Item 4 
Selection 6 
Here, the E revision referring to the PRR technical review process, establishes 
less content rich manufacturing assessment criteria through the Critical Design Review 
(CDR) and as represented in production readiness assessments in keeping with the 
reporting of risk approach in the higher guidance of the JCIDS. The conclusion from this 
literature review is to recognize that a contractor establishes its own manufacturing 
requirements separate from DOD oversight and verifies compliance to produce an item 
by product functional qualification. The acquisition guidance then assumes the risk of a 
contractor’s production capability at MS C. The manufacturing process knowledge that 
may be concurrently developed in EMD is lacking objectivity and may be misleading or 
incomplete from the PRR conducted in support of MS C.  
Decision authorities lack an empirical conformance and demonstration of 
production capability in the DOD. Even the GAO manufacturing knowledge score card 
approach lacked an actual demonstration giving credit in favor of the contractor to 
proceed to LRIP on a promise that manufacturing will be under statistical control at some 
future time – effectively an unsecured I-Owe-You to exit the EMD phase (Dodaro 2013). 
This is similar to that reported by the Congressional Research Service’s report 




which is intended to prepare manufacturing and quality control processes for a higher rate 
of production and provide test models for operational test and evaluation (OT&E). Upon 
completion of OT&E, demonstration of adequate control over manufacturing processes, 
and with the approval of the MDA, a program can go into full rate production” (Schwarz 
2013, 10). Therefore, actual manufacturing knowledge is not required in establishing a 
developed manufacturing capability at MS C. 
The DAS never discusses directly that product qualification is a substitute for a 
manufacturing process capability demonstration but many program SOWs have stated 
this in the author’s experience. The manufacturing verification that eventually is assessed 
is deferred until the PCA and still fails to gain insight to supplier parts. Consider further 
the significance that the supply network is over 65% of content purchased or developed 
(Sullivan 2010). This means that manufacturing process knowledge is nearly invisible to 
DOD oversight in the sub-tier supply network. Beyond view are quality factors that 
indicate production capability such as, scrap rates, process variability and first-pass-yield. 
As long as deliveries are met and a part had been qualified then no additional supplier 
insight is required – including any production capability.  
e. Reference Appendix E Selections from DOD Acquisition Policy: Item 4 
Selection 7 
The TRL process and technical risk of critical elements is considered a rigorous 
process in the TMRR acquisition phase that identifies and manages product technology 
needing insight as it matures through development. The critical elements are required to 
have an assessment by statutory requirement. Specifically, this is referenced in DODI 
5000.02. 
Sullivan (2010) also reported the welcoming of the MRL assessment process to 
improve manufacturing knowledge and to improve production outcomes. The new MRL 
process was to consider relevant manufacturing environment development in a similar 
manner to TRL assessments appropriate to the life cycle acquisition process. Sullivan 




the DOD acquisition process would realize a knowledge-based approach over the risk-
based approach decried by the GAO: 
A serious concern is that DOD’s in-house manufacturing workforce has 
been diminishing for decades and that, therefore, could hamper successful 
implementation of MRLs. Unless DOD develops long-range plans to build 
its in-house manufacturing workforce, it may not be able to realize the full 
potential of integrating manufacturing readiness levels into its processes 
(47). 
and 
Direct the Office of the Director, Defense Research and Engineering to 
examine strengthening the MRL criteria related to the process capability 
and control of critical components and/or interfaces prior to MS C, or 
equivalent, for low-rate initial production decision (47). 
With the on-going findings of the GAO and the review of the DAS documents, a 
clear picture of what is absent in DOD manufacturing knowledge compared to non-DOD 
industries reveals weaknesses in the DOD approach. Acquisition practices in the DOD at 
MS C do not demonstrate production capability or producibility performance to any 
specified standards. Therefore, the DOD weapons acquisition process fails to provide a 





III. PROJECT APPROACH 
A. VALUE-HIERARCHY DEVELOPMENT AND THE ICOM MODEL  
Systems engineering methods and tools can help define a development path 
hoping to satisfy a system’s requirements. The SE approach endeavors to establish a 
value-hierarchy representing the desired state of process or product. In support of this 
thesis SE analysis, there are simple process definition tools used to introduce evaluation 
characteristics for the more detailed AOA discussed in Chapter III, Section C.  
One tool that helps explore this space is the input/controls/output/methods 
(ICOM) model (KBSI 2014). The ICOM model can provide a visual and contextual view 
of the DOD production approval process. The content of the current DOD process is 
defined by the manufacturing development and approval process. This can be defined 
further by the development of the DOD acquisition system’s concept of operations 
(CONOPS) giving a one page pictorial view of a system’s broad conceptual operation. 
The definition of simplified ICOM structure of the DOD manufacturing development and 
approval process is represented in Figure 11. 
 




In general, the ICOM representation provides an understanding of basic 
requirements, methods and inputs needed to describe high level production acquisition 
process activities and show output, as in our case, as either a future effective state or a 
current ineffective state. At this stage of modeling, the ICOM highlights the key elements 
of a production system that include: manpower, material, methods, and machines.  
B. REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION IN THE SEDP METHOD 
System engineering practices will define requirements in early phases of a project. 
These requirements are refined through a capture of stakeholder and user needs to 
understand desired customer usage and avoid potential problems in system definition. 
High-level user needs and lower-level derived requirements are developed to help 
achieve a robust solution against competing alternatives. The SEDP process follows 
guidance found in a published handbook given by the Air Force Materiel Command 
(AFMC 2014). In this study there is a development of a hierarchical functional valuing of 
the manufacturing production approval processes to support a modeling and assessment 
objectively contrast alternative best practices.  
C.  AOA USED IN THE SEDP APPROACH  
An AOA approach provides decision makers with a well-reasoned assessment 
describing the factors and modeling criteria that can be used as the basis for selection of a 
preferred alternative. The AOA approach guides the problem solving process towards a 
selection from alternatives that might best achieve desired capabilities. The preferred 
solution can emerge out of a complex fog of potential resources.  
The comparative approach of the AOA establishes a reasonable story showing 
how best practices are able to satisfy a preferred process outcome from the alternatives 
under study. When a preferred solution emerges from an AOA there is an opportunity for 
decision makers to consider improvement potential, innovation, cost reduction and risk 
reduction for the problems they are trying to solve. It is often a prudent approach in the 
SE selection process to devise a verification test to evaluate any proposed solution 
confirming the preferred alternative. In SEDP, this execution step is an initial action step. 




or time may be required to reach a better alternative that balances between competing 
goals of cost, performance and schedule.  
D. STAKEHOLDERS 
This study recognizes there are various stakeholder interests. Identifying and 
understanding stakeholder interest leads to refinement of higher-level requirements and 
their associated value-functions with process and quality objectives. Identifying these 
objectives operationally is a precursor to associating appropriate and measurable process 
best practices. The development of measurable objectives to achieve improved 
production outcomes are intended to satisfy customer expectations as developed in the 
CONOPS discussion in this chapter, section E.  
This researcher used the literature review and experience to develop a mapping of 
stakeholder interests to manufacturing related business practices. This mapping is used to 
translate stakeholder values into process objectives. Process objectives can be related to 
best practices. With any best practice there is a presumption of quality when they come 
from successful organizations. In other words, successful organizations achieve their 
success by their business practices. Using the best practice presumption, one can assert 
that if an industrial practice is in use by an organization, then that organization derives 
value with its practice likely satisfying stakeholder needs. 
Stakeholder value streams can be associated with more clarity by looking into 
stakeholders as actors and with transactional roles within the context of the acquisition 
activities in production part approval with the intention of achieving ideal production 
outcomes. In DOD acquisition, stakeholders who are the users of the acquisition products 
are the COCOM. The associated operational attributes of stakeholder values present as 





Table 9.   Stakeholder to Process Improvement Suitability Factors 
 
 
In defining some differences between DOD and non-DOD stakeholders there are 
factors specifically related to the production approval process as used in non-DOD 
practices. Suitability factors for production approval stakeholders are related to DOD 
acquisition as factors important to end-item users. In the DOD acquisition environment 
prime contractors are the OEMs and in non-DOD acquisition development environments 
users are the customers who purchase products from OEMs.  
There is a need to further develop the identification of high level stakeholder 
values to measurable objectives. A functional hierarchy can describe a value stream from 
user need to lower-level functional and sub-functional values for modeling measurable 
attributes as measures of performance (MOP). Analytically, the lowest measurable 
behavior for each best practice becomes a key measure of performance for scoring in the 
AOA. The creation of a hierarchy then provides the means to assess alternatives and 
creates elements to define a preferred concept of operations in production approval 
processes. In the next section, a discussion of stakeholders and their relationship to the 
context of production approval use-cases fully form an operational concept. Two cases 
will be described to explain the descriptive and normative approval process CONOPs. 
Stakeholder Suitability Factors for Best Practices
Supplier Improved business efficiencies 
Supplier Improved requirements definition
Supplier Improved production capability 
Supplier Improved process capability 
User/OEM Improved production outcomes




E. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT 
The DOD’s Architectural Framework (DODAF) can communicate a view of a 
system’s CONOPS at a glance. The system level view of key transactional relationships 
reveals a system’s actors in their interactive behaviors. A complex problem under the 
treatment of an AOA can use the development of an operational concept to clarify the 
descriptive and normative use cases and associated process outcomes. The variation 
found in alternatives assists the robustness of an AOA assessment of study alternatives to 
satisfy system needs. The identification of process attributes and MOPs in the various 
approaches provides differentiating criteria found in an alternative and its ability to 
provide improvement potential.  
With the identification of three operationally different industrial alternatives the 
study was able to construct for comparison the operational concepts contrasting non-
DOD to DOD production approval process. These alternatives were different with respect 
to the types of knowledge required to make production decisions for their associated 
commercial production processes. The DOD approach tended to focus on product 
technology and functional requirements and the non-DOD organizations had an 
additional focus upon manufacturing development and demonstration of manufacturing 
capability. Identifying two non-DOD alternative production approval processes came 
from regulatory agencies: 1) the FAA (commercial aircraft industry) and 2) the FDA 
(medical industry). The automobile industry was a third commercial industry used to 
compare acquisition alternatives for production approval processes.  
 In the non-DOD sectors, the part suppliers required a PSW approval allowing 
that supplier to enter production. The supplier had to certify that an item demonstrated 
functional and manufacturing process capability together with any unique requirements 
and regulatory compliance prior to gaining approval to market those products. In the 
automotive industry the OEMs directly managed the requirements for compliance in 
support of a vehicle’s production. The FDA and FAA, as regulatory agencies, govern 
compliance by law; (“Appendix C. FAA Memo”), (“Appendix I. FDA Procedures, 
Premarket Approval”), (“Appendix N. Understanding the Automotive QMS”) and 




The non-DOD industries assure production-approval conformance by their 
certification requirement. The requirements did not allow a supplier to change its 
manufacturing process or location of manufacturing without reevaluation of the changed 
process and recertification. In addition, the readiness certification required a compliant 
company’s QMS to show a registration to their QMS by a third party, a configuration 
managed design definition for product and process, product qualification, a working 
production environment and a process capability demonstration as determined at 
production rates. In contrast, the DOD accepts supply network parts into inventory when 
that supplier passes a qualification based on performance of a part’s functionally.  
The DOD production approval process for suppliers asserts, by policy, that a part 
can enter inventory if that part is subject to a functional qualification without any 
verification that a supplier is capable to produce based on any process verification. The 
significance of a demonstrated process control in the supply network is to achieve 
sustained quality compliance and prevent poor product outcomes. At times, the DOD 
may on a case-by-case basis include additional verifications of a supplier’s parts through 
a first article inspection and acceptance test. This type of added contractor activity relates 
to unique and non-standard purchase agreements with their suppliers.  
The lack of a standard approach to production approval identifies why non-DOD 
producers have solved the issues reported by the GAO. A demonstrated repeatable 
production process that includes the entire supply network ensures the desired consistent 
production outcomes. In general, the DOD does not consider the supply network of the 
prime contractor beyond part qualification unless by exception. 
1. The Current DOD Production Approval Process CONOP 
Developing the graphical representation of the DOD production approval process 
defines a depiction of the actors and activities with communications and decisions points. 
This operational view (OV) provides a means to describe the interworking and execution 
of the DOD production approval process. The high-level contextual operational view, 
OV-1, provides a visualization of a system in a static sense with various nodal 




at the top and moving counter-clockwise to show the life-cycle acquisition process of the 
activities leading up to production approval and concluding with FRP.  
The current state of the DOD production approval process is referred to as the 
descriptive state of operations of the production approval process in review. This 
acquisition environment shown by the OV-1 captures the actors with key organizational 
elements. The transactional nature of program management includes the production 
approval event at MS C with the milestone decision authority involvement.  
The DOD acquisition technical review event that considers production readiness 
is the PRR technical review conducted just prior to MS C. The PRR assesses the pre-
production baseline. This approach has a high degree of variation in the absence of 
formal standards and relies on a checklist approach that has inherent weaknesses if not 
outright omission in determining a given process capability. The results of a PRR reports 
manufacturing risk to the PM and the PM may inform the CPD about manufacturing risk. 
The CPD is the reviewable document given to the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) to 
affect production approval.  
The PRR review is to assure that a production readiness has been achieved with 
any reported risk when a program is to transition from the EMD to the PD phase. The 





Table 10.   Descriptive—DOD Actors / Stakeholders DOD Roles and 
Activities 
Actor Organization Transaction 






Manage program/funding; Apply JCIDS - KPPs / 
KSAs-> COIs/MOEs/TPMs); Use -Case for System for 
fulfilling unrealized capability need Evaluate 





From MS B - Provide Development of Product and 
Process (TMRR/EMD); Establish product baseline and 




Provide Support Services for Product In Operational 
Environment/Intermediate; Organizational; Depot 
Services Contractor 




Provide Funding; JCIDS High-level requirements – 
KPP; KSA; Periodic Program Approval 
Supply Network Supplier tiers 








Completes DD250 to approve of payment for 
compliant deliveries 
Panel Members Contractor 
Provide Recommendation to decision authorities at 











Here, a program determines if requirements from the JCIDS process have been 
satisfied. The CPD is the document that reports the support for a decision to advance to 
production. In brief, these requirements cover: 1) production items that are purchased at 
the contracted price and delivery schedule and 2) production items that meet the design 
requirements through qualification. The end goal of the DOD production approval 
process is to ensure that items produced are suitable and effective as observed by the 




If approval to start production is to be granted then it occurs at MS C. This does 
not include a production capability demonstration. The OV-1 shows that it is not until 
after production has started at the end of LRIP that a PCA would support a demonstrated 
production capability assessment.  
The DOD as-is state OV-1 shows that development of the production system 
continues into PD through LRIP. Therefore, it is uncertain that the LRIP experience will 
actually mature the manufacturing environment and be able to demonstrate a production 
rate and capability to support an FRP. Any deficiency found at the PCA will hinder 
production into FRP with its associated impact on fleet readiness and effectiveness. This 
uncertainty is quite different when applying best practices as observed in non-DOD 
production approval processes that certify the ability to produce prior to production start. 
 
Figure 12.  (OV-1) DOD Descriptive (Current) State 
2. The Non-DOD Production Approval Processes  
The assessment of actors and roles in the automotive acquisition process for 




supply base. The FAA and FDA use an agency-acceptable QMS such as the AS-9100 or 
ISO-9000 standards. The FDA and FAA append the addition of regulatory specific 
requirements and a demonstration to production approval requirements making their 
production approval processes more like the automotive process. The intended 
production capability is resolved by the use of the non-DOD prescriptive standards and 
requirements following their QMS. Contextual information is shown from the automotive 
perspective to create the transactional relationships from their best practices. See Table 
11. These transactions describe how compliance for production readiness leads to a 
production decision in non-DOD industries.  
The description of actors, organizations and transactions for the automotive 
industry production approval process is very similar to the other non-DOD production 
approval processes. The context, shown by the automotive production approval process 
develops and demonstrates production readiness from their best practices from a 
disciplined manufacturing development and demonstration approach using their industry 
standards. These unique non-DOD acquisition elements capture the knowledge-based 
production approval processes observed by the GAO reporting (Sullivan 2008).  
Table 11.   Automotive Actors and Activities Using a PPAP Certification 




Requirements; Integrator; Producer; Sell/ 
Warrant /Service; Product Sold to Users 
User / 
Customer 
Individual or Organization Buy / Use Vehicle 
Dealer –
Service 
OEM or Independent Sell / Service Vehicle 
Government / 
Legal 
National Transportation and 
Safety Board 
Requirements 




Component / Subsystem 
Supplier Tier 1 – to OEM 













Certification Bodies – Quality 
System; 






AIAG/SAE/ASQ/SE Related Training; supply base enablers 
 
3. Normative DOD Production Approval Process  
A normative state production approval process for DOD implementation 
considers the integration of non-DOD best practices. The transactional actors and actions 
are described by synthesizing necessary elements of the current DOD process and 
merging non-DOD production approval processes. This normative (or ideal) state for 
DOD production approval would then describe actors, organizations and transactions of 
both QMS based systems. The modifications formed in this way use the current DOD 
actors of Table 10 and those best practices of non-DOD industries found in Table 11. The 
combined actors and transactional behavior from the synthesis and integration of 
commercial best practices with the DOD transactions are in Table 12. 
 
Table 12.   Normative—DOD Actors / Stakeholders DOD Roles and 
Activities 
Actor Organization Transaction Comment 




Provide Funding; JCIDS High-level 
requirements determined – KPP; KSA; 











Manage program/funding; Apply JCIDS - 
KPPs / KSAs-> COIs/MOEs/TPMs); Use 
-Case for System for fulfilling unrealized 
capability need Evaluate Suitability and 














Provide Development of Product and 
Process – Technical Maturity and Risk 
Reduction and (EMD); Establish product 
baselines and provide demonstrated 






Tier 1; Tier 2 
and … 
Supply network provides evidence for 
APQP and PPAP – to higher tier. Tier 1 to 
Prime Contractor PPAP. 
 
Modified 
3rd Party Certifier 
Certification 
Bodies – Quality 
System 








Related Training; supply base enablers 
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Assessment of Contract Compliance;  
Completes DD250 to approve of payment 
















Provide Recommendation to decision 
authorities at Project Milestones; Provide 










Provide Support Services for Product In 
Operational Environment/Intermediate; 








Provide Support Services for Product In 
Operational Environment/Intermediate; 
Organizational; Depot Services 
Provides items/services to prime; Follows 
PPAP – as needed in PD. Follow 





The integration of non-DOD best practices into the DOD acquisition process 




a glance is shown in Figure 13. It is important to point out that the knowledge-based 
manufacturing method recommended by the GAO is fully captured in the synthesis of 
DOD with non-DOD standards providing a production commitment at MS C.  
The normative model reveals key changes over the current state DOD OV-1 by 
pulling the DOD PCA ahead prior to MS C. The PRR, in EMD, would then include the 
demonstration of process capability using the DOD PCA demonstration of process 
capability prior to MS C. This would pull the nature of the MRL ratings to a higher level 
of MRL 9 at the end of EMD. The necessary evidence of a functional production line at 
the end of EMD incorporates a full development and verification of the production line 
prior to production commitment at the end of EMD.  
This CONOPS review sets up the development and analysis conducted in the 
thesis AOA. This synthesis would likely have to assure that development funding 
incorporates the manufacturing development fully prior to LRIP to launch a completed 
production line. In the alternative the full manufacturing development and demonstration 
could require long lead funding of a production contract that is pulled into EMD to build 
production items in the pre-PD phase rather than using LRIP to develop the final FRP 





Figure 13.  (OV-1) DOD Normative (Ideal) State 
F. BEST PRACTICE BEHAVIORS 
The AOA assessment of alternative production part approval processes fulfils a 
need in DOD acquisition to consider improving the current culture that has prevented the 
implementation of best practice opportunities. Specifically, if an organization wants to 
improve it must have a bias to improve business operations and do so purposefully. 
Gardner (2004) “The Process-Focused Organization,” indicates that the creation of a 
policy group or best practice council is an effective means to identify and manage 
continuous improvement. Gardner further explains that an organization needs to look 
across and outside organizational lines to conduct best practices research. 
This is the same notion the GAO asserted indicating that the DOD should look to 
industries outside the DOD that were more successful because they had demonstrated a 
followed a more disciplined approach to production development and demonstration of 




Gardner (chapter 9.7), describes a two-part strategy—first to research potential best 
practices and secondly to provide an evaluation and implementation activity. Gardner’s 
approach is in agreement with the SEDP approach to problem solving. Improvement 
opportunity needs to be ingrained in organizational culture by including and empowering 
an improvement council to provide a way to evaluate and manage change. Each of the 
non-DOD best practices was at some point identified and was found to contribute to 
operational success and business improvements. This aligns with the SAE’s purpose to 









IV. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
A. DEVELOPING THE STUDY AOA MODEL 
The study AOA forms a part of a SE problem solving effort examining a process 
that needs improvement in DOD acquisition practices with respect to production 
approval. This AOA captures an improvement potential by comparing the alternate 
production approval processes of the FDA, FAA, and automotive industry to the DOD 
approach and assesses industry best practices and that have shown superior results. Using 
the Air Force AOA handbook helped to model the assessment of best practices as found 
in an industry’s QMS (such as the QS-9000 family of standards for the automotive 
industry), those practices of the FAA (aircraft sector), and the FDA (medical devices 
sector) (AFMC 2014). QMS best practices were identified and described by each of the 
study QMS types as ISO-9000 non-prescriptive and QS-9000 prescriptive QMS. The 
FAA and FDA regulatory process construct has been described by their respective federal 
regulations are found on agency websites. From the FAA website - FAA.gov and the 
FDA website FDA.gov respectively a high degree of fidelity their production approval 
processes are outlined. The government websites contained the relevant information in 
support of a comparative analysis needed for the AOA.  
B. QUALITY MANAGEMENT STANDARDS COMPARISON 
The differences between QMS approaches of ISO-9000 and QS-9000 were 
significant for the unique U.S. requirements driven by Ford, General Motors and Chrysler 
and the more global ISO standards development. The QS-9000 included additional 
business processes such as planning, customer satisfaction, continuous improvement, 
manufacturing capabilities and advanced quality planning. The automotive industry 
needed a uniformly prescriptive set of instructions as best practices using their experience 
and influence to advantage. The desired improvements in manufacturing capabilities 
needed to be confirmed by a PPAP submission of a warrant prior to production. The 
American OEMs also knew that improved production outcomes needed manufacturing 




standards for manufacturing employed the APQP, a synergistic partner communicated by 
guidelines as advanced by the AIAG consortium.  
The aerospace and defense sectors adopted the ISO-9001 standard and embedded 
it into the aerospace QMS AS-9000 and conforming later the release of the AS-9100 
QMS. Aerospace (including National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Aerospace, 
and Defense) unified their approach, but unlike the automotive QMS, the aerospace 
standards stayed more aligned to the generic best practices found in the ISO-9000.  
The DOD could invoke by contract the use of the AS-9100 QMS for prime 
contractors but did little to standardize this application of a QMS in supply networks 
leaving supply chain management to each prime contractor. The DOD did not require any 
customer specific or prescriptive practices differentiating DOD contractors as adherents 
of the ISO-9000 type of QMS.  
The adoption of the QS-9000 standards as a requirement for suppliers found over 
time that there were considerable quality, economic and customer satisfaction gains. The 
AIAG and the ASQ had an interest in measuring the impact of the constituent supplier 
application in the new automotive QMS. Specifically they wanted to measure if the 
OEM’s quest to improve product quality and regain market share through applying the 
QS-9000 QMS was working. Many participating organizations were interviewed and 
captured these results in an ASQ survey. This survey was conducted ten years after QS-
9000 introduction in 1997 with a confirming follow-on survey in 1998.  
Subsequently the McGraw-Hill company conducted a survey of ISO-9000 
companies (comparable to the DOD AS9100 QMS application). The comparison and 
basic affect is given in stark contrast showing significant differences in quality in 
application of those suppliers adopting the QS-9000 standards and the McGraw-Hill 
survey (see Table 13) (AIAG/ASQ 1997;Naveh, Marcus and Koo Moon 1999). 
The automotive industry standards established a common product and process 
development language between OEM and supplier. There were common expectations 
following the common QMS for design and production authority within the supply chain 




organizations dendritically. The intent to have one QMS identified with proven methods 
paid-off. Suppliers were required to satisfy OEM minimum requirements and submit 
evidence that products would meet product and production performance targets prior to 
an OEM’s production commitment.  
Table 13.   Survey Benefit Results—ISO Vice QS-9000 QMS 
 
 
Member companies were required to conduct a third-party audit to establish 
compliance costing an average of $40,000; see Table 13. Bandyopadhyay (1996, 12) 
confirmed this approximate fee averaged about $50,000 to register including most 
preparation fees not expressly recorded in the survey findings. 
1. Statistical Significance and Quality Standard Type 
If an organization is to seek to improve business processes then various 
alternatives can be competed to find a better approach. A selection between two 
processes could be evaluated by a comparison of two treatments. If each treatment had 
many trials that expressed results as success or failure then a best process could emerge 
based on this performance. In this study of production approval process alternatives the 
ISO-9000 QMS as one treatment – characterized by its non-prescriptive approach and the 
QS-9000 QMS as a second treatment – characterized by its prescriptive approach. The 
DOD acquisition approach considers a prime contractor that adheres to the ISO-9000 or 
AS-9100 type QMS. Then non-DOD organizations that use a prescriptive QMS like the 








Economic Benefits Quality Defect Rate
QS 9000 Combined
3 to 1 return on total 
costs
50% of respondents 50% 









1.3 to 1 return on total 
cost
6% of respondents                                                                                                                                                                                                        
indicated a reduction in defect rate 






To contrast the survey results the key question asked in each trial group (survey 
respondent) was to assess if there was an improvement observed under the treatment 
application of their respective QMS types. The ISO QMS type showed quality 
improvement in just 6% of 1100 cases. In the Automotive type QMS they recorded an 
improvement in 50% of respondents in 800 cases. The results of these trials were able to 
show a significant difference with the automotive QS-9000 QMS had better quality results 
than the ISO-9000 QMS. In this way, a reviewer could discriminate between processes if 
the differences observed were sufficient to recommend one treatment as better than the 
other where the differences were not due to randomness and change from sampling alone. 
Data was analyzed from the commercial surveys providing the production outcomes by 
QMS type. A test of significance at the (1 – .05 alpha) level was conducted. See Table 14. 
The results confirm that there is a significant difference observed at the alpha .05 level with 
a p-value of 0.000. Those respondents that used the ISO-9000 standard of Treatment A 
versus those that used the QS-9000 of treatment B were found different favoring the QS-
9000 QMS as providing superior quality improvement.  
Table 14.   Survey Benefit Results—ISO Vice QS-9000 Test of Significance 
Two Sample Proportions - TEST 
ISO-9000 QMS vs QS-9000 QMS 
P value at the alpha .05 level = 0.000     
Quality 








Sample (P)  
Survey Source 
Treatment A 
ISO-9000* 1100 66 0.06 McGraw-Hill 1999 
Treatment B 
QS-9000**   800 400 0.5 AIAG/ASQ 1997/8 
Note: 95% CI for p(QS) - p(ISO): (0.402618, 0.477382) Estimate for p(QS) - p(ISO): 0.44 
Test for p(QS) - p(ISO) = 0 (vs not = 0): Z = 23.07 P-Value = 0.000 
* ISO companies reported only 6% improved due to ISO 9000 as their QMS (no degree of improvement reported) 




In any survey study it is important to make an assessment regarding validity and 
reliability. Environmental factors show that each QMS matured in use about ten years. 
Each QMS type standard had at its core the same ISO 9000 elements. The primary 
difference between QMS standards was the enhancement defined by the guidance of the 
APQP and requirement of a PPAP. The PPAP used SPC to demonstrated process 
capability prior to production commitment. In addition, there was a global nature of each 
supply network surveyed with the ISO 9000 type QMS favoring more European 
respondents with both QMS used in a global economy. The repeat nature of the QS-9000 
survey showed similar, in position, results of respondents being just separated by time. 
Therefore, the commercial surveys cited were found to have validity and reliability. 
2. Benefits of Prescriptive Quality Standards 
The published surveys by ASQ/AIAG and McGraw Hill indicated that the 
automotive industry’s ISO enhanced standards (QS-9000 /ISO/TS-16949) performed 
remarkably better with respect to quality outcomes than the ISO based QMS as used in 
the DOD. The QS-9000 based QMS surveys revealed a benefit analysis captured in a 
presentation by Ireland (2000), citing that AIAG/ASQ 1998 Quality Survey, “Cost 
Benefit Summary with 600 Respondents”: 
Of the 600 survey respondents using the QS-9000 automotive quality 
management systems standards it was reported that sales increased by 6% 
or $10,000,000 per company on average. The supply network applied the 
quality standards, received third party registration and followed the 
production approval approach of the automotive OEMs (Ireland 2000). 
Ireland also reported (2009) that there was an increase in vehicle durability over 
that same period where vehicles improved their durability by more than 1.5 years; now 
averaging 8 years (Ireland 2009). USA Today agreed with Ireland in that the automotive 
vehicle reliability was increasing and that it continued to increase showing the average 
age of a vehicle on the road now exceeds 11.4 years (Bomey 2015). 
Further study on vehicle durability over time showed that there was a correlation 
aligned to the adoption of the QS-9000 family of standards and the data published from 




Transportation Statistics , (USDTOASR & TBOT), showing calendar year versus average 
age of vehicle on the road from 1980 to 2000 (USDTOASR & TBOT 2014). What is 
noticeable is that durability growth was flat from 1985 to 1990 prior to QS-9000. There 
was a continuation of sustained growth through 2000 based on the DOT reporting. The 
linear best line fit to the DOT age data from 1990 to 2000 can be projected at this same 
rate of growth linearly through 2015 (Figure 14). 
The nature of these results shows mathematical correlation that the production 
approval process for the automotive industry was supported. Ireland (2009) reported that 
there were a number of organizational benefits from the use of the automotive standards: 
 Suppliers realized cost efficiencies by the use of a common standard  
 Suppliers realized product quality and reliability improvement  
 OEM realized vehicle quality and reliability improvement 
 OEM realized cost efficiencies by use of a common standard, 23  
There were no similar quality improvements reported by the McGraw-Hill survey 
under the use of the ISO-9000 standard from 1100 respondents (Naveh, Marcus and 
Moon 1999). The benefits of a prescriptive QMS as used in the auto industry provided 
the compelling reason for the development of a detailed functional analysis for AOA 





Figure 14.  Automobile Durability Average No. of Years on the Road. Adapted 
from USDTOASR&TBOT (2014).  
C. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Information concerning stakeholder needs leads to an identification of functional 
values and sub-values that develop discrimination criteria for the exercise of the AOA. 
The functional analysis helps define factors of a measurable effectiveness against 
identifiable alternative best practice behaviors.  
A process of functional analysis starts with the higher-level requirements in 
stakeholder needs. Building upon the simple ICOM model the additional description with 
the DOD acquisition process can show the current and ideal state output (Figure 15). The 
output side of the ICOM model shows that there is a difference in expectations for poor 
and ideal production performance. By using the findings from the AIAG/ASQ and 
McGraw-Hill QMS surveys a case supporting a normative outcome was developed. 
The underlying performance improvement in the automotive industry best 
practices is traced to the use of prescriptive quality standards. Production approval 
process alternatives could then address the gap between descriptive and the normative 
production process outcomes. Consider the supporting quote: “It must be possible to 
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Note: Mean age is equal to the sum of the products of units multiplied by age; divided by the total units. Source: 
Ward's Communications, Ward's Motor Vehicle Facts and Figures 2001. (compiled from The Polk Company data).
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Note: 1985 to 1991 no durability improvement, flat 
response, QS9000 family of standards started in 1990, 




option or another approaches the ideal” (Gibson, Scherer, and Gibson, 2007, 2). As 
shown in the ICOM diagram and the OV-1 model there is a contrast of results by 
organizational QMS type. See the descriptive OV-1 in Figure 12 and the normative OV-1 
in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 15.  ICOM Model with Normative and Descriptive Output. 
The value system for a production approval process has its genesis in the GAO’s 
reporting of the manufacturing related causal factors for poor production outcomes. 
When examining the manufacturing causal factors the study identified six key objectives 
for evaluation. See Table 15. The study value system of hierarchical functions and sub-
functions are reviewable starting in Figure 16. The value system continues as derivative 
elements into measurable evaluation factors within the value stream establishing 
increasing fidelity into sub-functions. See Figure 17. For completeness of the study 
problem space, the shaded “gray box” items include notionally the two additional causal 
factors reported by the GAO related to poor production outcomes as excluded items in 
the study.  
A structure tracing six binning categories for the higher-level objectives to 
various counting lower-level measurable sub-functions under each bin that applies. These 
lower level objectives are the countable measures of performance aligned to individual 




best practice under value element 1.1 is “QMS ISO-9000; AS-9100; ISO/TS-16949 w/ 
Certification” (Figure 17). The element 1.1 is then the lowest measure of performance 
(MOP) under study as a measurable objective. Reviewing all measurable objectives starts 
with objective 1.0 through objective 6.0 showing 37 identifiable evaluation items in the 
AOA. The MOP elements define a discrete listing of best practices in production part 
approval processes. The study MOPs are the countable number of individual best 
practices aligned in relation to the six objectives. For all 37 MOPs; see Figure 17 through 
Figure 22. Definitions for each measurable best practice MOP is found in the appendix. 
For more information see “Appendix K. MOP Rationale and Weighting Factors.” 
The AOA’s ability to discriminate between alternatives under review is by the use 
of the six objectives defined as logical groupings of the countable best practices found in 
the non-DOD industry practices. These practices are articulated in the QS-9000 (ISO/TS-
16949) family of automotive standards and guidance manuals. The reason these MOPs 
represent the normative best practices is from the accounting that these quality system 
standards produced the best production outcomes observed by the GAO and the 
assessments from the commercial surveys in review. These best practices align to the 11 
normative production part approval best practice attributes and represent the prescriptive 
quality system captured in stakeholder needs (Table 15).  








Figure 16.  SEDP Value Stream—Key Study Objectives 
The modeling of weighting factors was developed for the six high level objectives 
in the scoring system. Each objective is weighted by the mapping of the 37 individual 
MOPs and their association with 11 normative attributes. See Appendix K MOP 
Rationale and Weighted Factors. An aggregate total score sums across each of the six 
objective categories. If a given alternative under study did not use a listed best practice 
attribute, then it would not receive a counting value in the aggregate of the objective 
measure. An example of a notional raw data matrix worksheet shows how scores roll into 
the raw data matrix for each alternative (Table 16). By applying these weighting factors 
to the countable score of the assessment criteria, then a selection from the alternatives 



















Figure 18.  Objective 2 - Value Hierarchy—Requirements Definition. 
 
 





Figure 20.  Objective 4 - Value Hierarchy—Product and Process Qualification. 
 
 






Figure 22.  Objective 6 - Value Hierarchy—Satisfaction and Economics. 
D. AOA DETAILS 
The AOA with its objectives and defined MOPS allows a comparative scoring 
based upon an alternative’s use of individual best practices. If the alternative production 
approval process utilizes a lower-level MOP best practice then a countable score would 
be awarded (Table 17). 
Table 17.   SEDP Detailed Lower-Level Measures of Performance 
Manufacturing Knowledge Gaps and Measures of Performance 
 Objective 1. Quality Systems Sub-Function Measures of Performance  
QMS, APQP & PPAP w/ 3rd Party 
Compliance  
1. QMS - ISO 9000/ AS9100 / ISO/TS 16949 
2. APQP Manufacturing Development Guidelines  
3. PPAP Followed - Pre-Production 
 Objective 2. Requirements  Sub-Function Measures of Performance 
Product & Process w/ PPAP 
Warrant  
1. Common Training - infrastructure 
2. Development Activities - APQP 
3. Warrant Approach - PPAP 
4. Product /Process - Performance – DFMEA/PFMEA 
5. Measurement System Analysis 
6. Process Validation (Stability & Control - SPC) 




Manufacturing Knowledge Gaps and Measures of Performance 
 
Product Definition, Maturity 
1. PDR, CDR % Drawings Completed 
2. Drawing Controls CM 
3. DOEs - Critical Characteristics Defined 
Process Definition - Stability and 
Control  
4. Not Stable: Pp Ppk >= 1.33 - LRIP 
5. Stable: Cpk >= 1.67 - FRP 
Risks Mitigated & Issues Resolved 
6. Product & Process Maturation 
7. Programmatic Corrective Action System  
8. DFMEA/PFMEA  
Objective 4. Qualification Sub-Function Measures of Performance 
Product & Process Qualification 
 Integration 
 Supply Network 
1. Measurement System Evaluation 
2. Product Qualification - Qualification, Acceptance Test 
Procedure & First Article Inspection and Test 
3. Process Verification - Attributes & Variables 
4. Supply Network APQP  
5. Supply Network DFMEA/PFMEA  
6. Supply Network MSA  
7. Supply Network SPC  
8. Supply Network PPAP 
Objective 5. Metrics Sub-Function Measures of Performance 
 
Corrective Action System 
 Non-Conformance / Yield /Scrap 
1. Field Failures - FRACAS 
2. Process Failures – Non-Conformance FRACAS 
3. Yield / Scrap Metrics - Targets - Achievements 
4. Lean / Six Sigma Results - DIMAC 
 Reliability / Durability 
5. Qualification - Test 
6. Field Performance - Warranty 
7. Things Gone Wrong / Right 
Objective 6. Customer Satisfaction Sub-Function Measures of Performance 
Quality Economics 
PAF Model of Quality Improvement 
1. Metrics Established - Enterprise 
2. Metrics Established - Local 
3. PAF Managed 
Business Economics 
4. Sales Performance 
5. Market Share Performance 
 
In the SEDP approach, the AOA has a focus centered on high-level objectives and 
deriving lower-level functional requirements. These lower-level requirements challenge 
the solution space. In this study, the AOA identified functional requirements by first 
creating a value stream functional analysis. The input of the best practice tally goes into 




each objective, is just the number of lower-level countable MOPs under that objective 
(See Table 18 through Table 20). 
Table 18.   SEDP AOA Results: Objective 1 and 2—Raw Evidence Tally. 
 











1. Quality Systems Objective MOP 1 Roll up -----> 1 3 3 3
QMS, APQP & PPAP w/ 3rd Party Compliance 
1. QMS - ISO 9000/ AS9100 / ISO/TS 16949 
2. APQP Manufacturing Development Guidelines 
3. PPAP Followed - Pre-Production
1 1,2,3 1,2.3 1,2,3
2. Requirements Understood Objective MOP 2 Roll up -----> 3 4 4 6
Product & Process w/ PPAP Warrant 
1.  Common Training - infrastructure
2.  Development Activities - APQP
3.  Warrant Approach - PPAP
4. Product /Process - Performance - FMEA
5. Measurement System Compliant (MSA)
6. Process Validation  (Stability & Control - SPC)
2,5 2,4,5,6 2,4,5,6 1,2,3,4,5,6
Evaluation Category:  Manufacturing Knowledge Gaps and Associated 
Measures of Performance Category by Alternative











1. Quality Systems Objective MOP 1 Roll up -----> 1 3 3 3
QMS, APQP & PPAP w/ 3rd Party 
Compliance 
1. QMS - ISO 9000/ AS9100 / ISO/TS 16949 
2. APQP Manufacturing Development Guidelines 
3. PPAP Followed - Pre-Production
1 1,2,3 1,2.3 1,2,3
2. Requirements Understood Objective MOP 2 Roll up -----> 3 4 4 6
Product & Process w/ PPAP Warrant 
1.  Common Training - infrastructure
2.  Development Activities - APQP
3.  Warrant Approach - PPAP
4. Product /Process - Performance - FMEA
5. Measurement System Compliant (MSA)
6. Process Validation  (Stability & Control - SPC)
2,5 2,4,5,6 2,4,5,6 1,2,3,4,5,6
 3. Design-Product/Process & Risk Objective MOP 3 Roll up -----> 4 4 4 7
Design Definition, Maturity
1. PDR, CDR % Drawings Completed
2. Drawing Controls CM
3. DOEs - Critical Characteristics Defined
1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2,3
Process Definition - Stability and Control 4. Not Stable: Pp Ppk >= 1.33 - LRIP
5. Stable:  Cp Cpk >= 1.67 - FRP
0 0 0 4,5
Risks Mitigated & Issues Resolved
6. Product & Process Maturation
7. Programmatic Corrective Action System 
8. Design FMEA &  PFMEA 
6,7 6,7 6,7 7,8
4. Product & Process Qualification Objective MOP 4 Roll up -----> 4 4 5 8
Evaluation Category:  Manufacturing Knowledge Gaps and Associated 
Measures of Performance Category by Alternative




Table 20.   SEDP AOA Results: Objective 5 and 6 – Raw Evidence Tally. 
 
 
The weighting factors are derived by the number of best practice attributes 
assigned to each of the six objectives. The score would just be the countable scored 
points times the weighting factor. The sum of the aligned weighting factors times the 
objective aggregate points for each alternative is the accumulated score for an alternative 
under study. The largest score would be the preferred solution. 
An individual score was the result of counting the MOPs by alternative then 
rolling up the tallies as points. These tallies entered into the AOA Scoring matrix. The 
Microsoft Excel tool then multiplied the weighting factor against the points accumulated 
for each objective and for each alternative. The summation of the objective scores would 
be a total for the alternative. The preferred solution after scoring would be the alternative 
with the largest score. See Table 21. The study AOA fully assessed shows the results that 
differentiate upon the preferred solution. The study points to the automotive production 
approval process with a score of 127. The next closest competing alternative achieved a 










5. Process & Product / Metrics Objective MOP 5 Roll up -----> 3 5 5 7
Corrective Action System
 Non-Conformance / Yield /Scrap
1. Field Failures - FRACAS
2. Process Failures – Non-Conformance FRACAS
3. Yield / Scrap Metrics - Targets - Achievements
4. Lean / Six Sigma Results - DIMAC
1,2 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3,4
 Reliability  / Durability
5.  Qualification - Test
6.  Field Performance - Warranty
7.  Things Gone Wrong / Right
5 5,6 5,6 5,6,7
6. - Customer Satisfaction Objective MOP 6 Roll up -----> 2 4 4 4
Quality Economics
PAF Model of Quality Improvement
1.  Metrics Established - Enterprise
2.  Metrics Established - Local
3.  PAF Managed
1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2
Business Economics
4. Sales Performance
5. Market Share Performance
0 4,5 4,5 4,5
Evaluation Category:  Manufacturing Knowledge Gaps and Associated 
Measures of Performance Category by Alternative




The results for the more prescriptive quality system, or QMS type, was 
significance given the finding of the AOA results involving the DOD, FAA, FDA and 
automotive industry. The production approval processes showing that the automotive 
industry approach was superior to all others for cost, schedule and performance over 
time. This analysis is one factor in determining the desirability of a new solution space 
for DOD acquisition practices. The APQP/PPAP process in the automotive industry 
demonstrated that there is a method in non-DOD industries that would satisfy the 
deficiencies pointed out by the GAO: 1) lack of standard and systematic methods and 2) 
lack of knowledge in contractor demonstration of production readiness prior to 
production commitment.  
Table 21.   SEDP AOA Results: Scored / Weighted and Preferred Solution 
 
 
This research used the findings from the various commercial quality standards, 
the literature review and personal experience as a subject matter expert to develop the 
study assessment criteria. Each criterion defined needed to have the qualities as having a 




The application of these criteria differentiated among candidates that one 
alternative practice would be most effective. A best practice improvement for DOD 
application would close the knowledge gap as reported by the GAO concerning 
manufacturing practices. The inference is that an improved process that has proven to 
achieve better production outcomes for the automotive sector would similarly improve 
poor production outcomes in DOD acquisition. This assessment approach is part of a 
method for a comparison of perspective best practices as discussed separately by Gardner 
with his process focused organizational approach and Gibson with respect to the SEDP 












Acquisition costs and fleet readiness have been affected adversely by poor 
production outcomes related to a lack of manufacturing knowledge at MS C. An 
examination of DOD and non-DOD production approval processes identified an 
opportunity to improve affordability and military readiness by improving the DOD’s 
approach to weapon systems production approval.  
In this thesis, an analysis of alternatives examined a family of commercial best 
practices used by non-DOD industries that followed a more disciplined approach to 
manufacturing development than DOD acquisition. Quality standards used by the non-
DOD industrial sectors validated manufacturing development and production capability 
with better production outcomes. The prescriptive QMS used by the automotive industry 
was significantly better than other alternatives. The AOA identified that the automotive 
approach is a preferred solution enjoying superior quality and improved product 
reliability.  
Specifically, the application of the American automotive production approval 
process helped suppliers see a gain in market share, a reduction in costs and a doubling of 
fielded reliability as a result of implementing a unified and prescriptive QMS. 
Automotive development required a more disciplined approach to product and process 
realization than DOD acquisition practices. The prescriptive QMS of the automotive 
industry used a knowledge-based production approval process with a production 
submission warrant leading to production approval. The degree of improvement was 
evident by findings reported in commercially conducted surveys. A listing of supporting 
findings from this research includes: 
 Department of Defense weapon systems production outcomes fall short of 
program goals with up to 34% of poor production outcomes coming from 




 Department of Defense acquisition policy provides minimal direction with 
respect to manufacturing development and verification of a production 
capability at MS C. 
 Non-Department of Defense a production part approval processes helped 
identify industrial best practices that demonstrated that a prescriptive 
QMS (QS-9000) would improve quality and reliability better than non-
prescriptive QMS (ISO-9000). 
 Manufacturers experienced significant improvements in quality and 
reliability based on the applying the automotive QMS. This QMS guided 
manufacturing development with a prescriptive manufacturing 
development process - APQP and then required a demonstration of 
production capability prior to production start using a certification process 
- PPAP. 
 The aerospace standards committee of the SAE realized in 2014 that the 
automotive approach would improve quality outcomes for the DOD and 
aerospace industry and added to the AS-9000 family of standards with the 
release of AS-9145 APQP and PPAP on November 8, 2016.  
 Department of Defense technical authority structure could invoke the AS-
9145 as a certification process to warrant production readiness compliance 
similar to non-DOD industries.  
The DOD is able to invoke these or related standards through the applicable Code 
of Federal Regulations. See Title 48, sec. 46, higher QMS requirements (Code of Federal 
Regulations, title 48, sec. 46.202.4).  
B. CONCLUSIONS 
This study was significant in that it addressed a gap in the research with respect to 
manufacturing causality of poor production outcomes in DOD acquisition. The findings 
are significant identifying critical processes behind a more disciplined manufacturing 




DOD industrial sectors required a certified demonstration of production readiness prior to 
production commitment and addressed the DOD’s poor production outcome causal 
factors. Non-DOD production approval processes studied used a more prescriptive QMS 
where compelling evidence of improvement potential was confirmed by commercial 
surveys comparing industry QMS. Industries that followed quality standards that address 
manufacturing development using an advanced product quality planning process with a 
warranted production part approval process preformed significantly better as contrasted 
with non-prescriptive QMS as found in the AS-9100 and ISO-9000 standards.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The automotive industry has relied upon the APQP/PPAP as part of a disciplined 
SE application to the manufacturing development process and has been highly effective 
for decades. The PPAP warrant process, as required by the automotive OEMs, is flowed 
down to the lowest-level supplier showing consistency of process and production results. 
The DOD should adopt the APQP/PPAP process to support a disciplined manufacturing 
development toward an earlier demonstrated production capability at the end of EMD. 
This would likely bring the pre-FRP PCA into EMD as a process improvement in DOD 
acquisition.  
 The DOD should continuing developing workforce enhancement in their 
competency aligned organizations with respect to manufacturing expertise. Additional 
workforce enhancement could be realized by using a third party organization such as the 
AIAG to train and enable all suppliers across the industrial base adjunct to being 
compliant to a required prescriptive QMS. The DOD should update the manufacturing 
related policy documents needed to implement the preferred prescriptive QMS as a 
requirement for the DOD supply base. Updated acquisition guidance should be developed 
in support of the APQP and PPAP. The DOD application of AS-9100 revision D should 
be required with its related AS-9145 standard that calls for APQP and PPAP. 
This study supports the standardization of production readiness demonstration for 
use in DOD acquisition. Prime contractors would engage their supply networks to apply 




change from a reporting of manufacturing risk to a reporting of process capability in a 
knowledge-based approach. Technical authorities should identify production capability as 
a “critical performance parameter” that would be required to establish a certification 
process in acquisition and appropriately update the JCIDS to include guidance for a 
PPAP approach. Here, the TA serving as a chief engineer (CHENG) within a program 
would represent process capability demonstration under a warrant process. Finally, a pilot 
program on large scale would better assess the impacts and benefits in a DOD application 
of an APQP / PPAP.  
The list of DOD acquisition structural enablers for APQP/PPAP implementation 
comes from an operational approach to include: 
 Engage Stakeholders: (OSD[AT&L], DDRE, MANTECH, NDIA, 
COCOMs, AIAG, SAE, ISO, ASQ ) Identify training roles and 
responsibilities. 
 Synthesize Comparative Processes: DOD/SETR process with PCA to the 
ISO/TS 16949/AS9145 and the requirements of the PPAP with Technical 
Warrant / Certification – through Supply Management; SE Manufacturing 
and Quality. 
 Engage the Policy Document Owners: Define Roles and Responsibilities – 
Within DOD policy, instructions and COCOMs (e.g., Naval Air Systems 
Command / Naval Sea System Command, Air Force and Army). 
 Engage a third party expertise to enable the supply network, such as the 
role found in the AIAG automotive consortium with respect to training 
and implementation of the APQP/PPAP. 
 Consider Acquisition Reform in contracting for DOD Weapon’s System 
programs where the role of enhanced QMS is standard and by exception if 
not used. 
 Consider identifying pilot contracts for implementation using AS9100 C 




46.202-4 (see AS-9100:2016 with attachment of AS9145 - - November 
2016 release) to impact the entire supply network of a prime contractor. 
 Strengthen the workforce competency, experience, and requirements to 
address what is the current state of DOD acquisition practices covering 
poor production outcomes impact related to manufacturing and a transition 
to the use of AS9145.  
 Apply a warrant process for production readiness as described in the SAE 
standard, AS-9145 APQP and PPAP with its PSW requirement. The 
purpose of the warrant leverages the benefits of this research as a best 
practice (Appendix E – DOD Technical Warrants). 
The DOD should examine the APQP/PPAP approach from any wide spread pilot 
program within the DOD acquisition process as a pathfinder for deploying a knowledge-
based acquisition for production approval. There is a presumption that this best practice 
from the automotive industry is now accepted by the SAE through the new AS-9145 
standard as modeled after the automotive best practices (SAE 2015).  
DOD would develop results using a knowledge-based production readiness 
approach while lowering the current risk-based manufacturing readiness practices. 
Results of production readiness demonstration would inform the MDA acquisition 
executives with confidence in an actual system at MS C.  
D. FUTURE STUDY 
Future study could include other items that would support this thesis that could 
not be employed due to lack of time or funding. The following list includes potential 
relevant ideas which do not fall within the scope of this thesis. 
 Develop detailed policy change documents covering the DAS including: 
 JCIDS; DAG; SYSCOM Instructions; MIL-HDBK-896 with AS9145 
 Interview the SAE G-14 members that developed the AS9145 APQP / 




 Develop Interview Questions; Identify Subjects; Submit to IRB for 
review; Conduct Interview; Analyze Results 
 Develop an operational implementation strategy and templates for all 
SYSCOM implementation: Contract Language; CDRLS; DIDs; SOWs; 
TEMP; CDP 
 Define Manufacturing Requirements for DOD Specification application 
Cpk; Ppk; Yield; PSW format and content 





APPENDIX A. PERRY MEMO 
The William Perry memo is presented in its entirety and is provided verbatim. 
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE        
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000          
29 Jun 94             
 
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS 
        CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 
        UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE 
        COMPTROLLER 
        ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMMAND, CONTROL, 
         COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE) 
        GENERAL COUNSEL 
        INSPECTOR GENERAL 
        DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION 
        DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES 
        COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
         COMMAND 
 
SUBJECT: Specifications & Standards - A New Way of Doing Business 
To meet future needs, the DOD must increase access to commercial state-of-the-art 
technology and must facilitate the adoption by its suppliers of business processes 
characteristic of world class suppliers. In addition, integration of commercial and military 
development and manufacturing facilitates the development of dual-use processes and 
products and contributes to an expanded industrial base that is capable of meeting defense 
needs at lower costs.  
I have repeatedly stated that moving to greater use of performance and commercial 
specifications and standards is one of the most important actions that DOD must take to 
ensure we are able to meet our military, economic, and policy objectives in the future. 
Moreover, the Vice President’s National Performance Review recommends that agencies 
avoid government-unique requirements and rely more on the commercial marketplace.  
To accomplish this objective, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition 
Reform) chartered a Process Action Team to develop a strategy and a specific plan of 
action to decrease reliance, to the maximum extent practicable, on military specifications 
and standards. The Process Action Team report, “Blueprint for Change,” identifies the 
tasks necessary to achieve this objective. I wholeheartedly accept the Team’s report and 
approve the report’s primary recommendation to use performance and commercial 
specifications and standards in lieu of military specifications and standards, unless no 
practical alternative exists to meet the user’s needs. I also accept the report of the Industry 




(Acquisition and Technology) to appropriately implement the Panel’s recommendations.  
I direct the addressees to take immediate action to implement the Team’s 
recommendations and assign the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and 
Technology) overall implementation responsibility. I direct the Under Secretary of 
Defense (Acquisition and Technology) to immediately arrange for reprogramming the 
funds needed in FY94 and FY95 to efficiently implement the recommendations. I direct 
the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Directors of the Defense Agencies to 
program funding for FY96 and beyond in accordance with the Defense Planning 
Guidance.  
Policy Changes  
Listed below are a number of the most critical changes to current policy that are needed to 
implement the Process Action Team’s recommendations. These changes are effective 
immediately. However, it is not my intent to disrupt on-going solicitations or contract 
negotiations. Therefore, the Component Acquisition Executive (as defined in Part 15 of 
DOD Instruction 5000.2), or a designee, may waive the implementation of these changes 
for on-going solicitations or contracts during the next 180 days following the date of this 
memorandum. The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) shall 
implement these policy changes in DOD Instruction 5000.2, the Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), and any other instructions, manuals, 
regulations, or policy documents, as appropriate.  
Military Specifications and Standards: Performance specifications shall be used when 
purchasing new systems, major modifications, upgrades to current systems, and non-
developmental and commercial items, for programs in any acquisition category. If it is not 
practicable to use a performance specification, a non-government standard shall be used. 
Since there will be cases when military specifications are needed to define an exact design 
solution because there is no acceptable non-governmental standard or because the use of a 
performance specification or non-government standard is not cost effective, the use of 
military specifications and standards is authorized as a last resort, with an appropriate 
waiver.  
Waivers for the use of military specifications and standards must be approved by the 
Milestone Decision Authority (as defined in Part 2 of DOD Instruction 5000.2). In the case 
of acquisition category ID programs, waivers may be granted by the Component 
Acquisition Executive, or a designee. The Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion shall 
determine the specifications and standards to be used for naval nuclear propulsion plants in 
accordance with Pub. L. 98–525 (42 U.S.C. §7158 note). Waivers for reprocurement of 
items already in the inventory are not required. Waivers may be made on a “class” or items 
basis for a period of time not to exceed two years.  
Innovative Contract Management: The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and 




Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) language to encourage contractors 
to propose non-government standards and industry-wide practices that meet the intent of 
the military specifications and standards. The Under Secretary will make this language 
effective 180 days after the date of this memorandum. This language will be developed for 
inclusion in both requests for proposal and in on-going contracts. These standards and 
practices shall be considered as alternatives to those military specifications and standards 
cited in all new contracts expected to have a value of $100,000 or more, and in existing 
contracts of $500,000 or more having a substantial contract effort remaining to be 
performed.  
Pending completion of the language, I encourage the Secretaries of the Military 
Departments and the Directors of the Defense Agencies to exercise their existing authority 
to use solicitation and contract clause language such as the language proposed in the 
Process Action Team’s report. Government contracting officers shall expedite the 
processing of proposed alternatives to military specifications and standards and are 
encouraged to use the Value Engineering no-cost settlement method (permitted by FAR 
48.104-3) in existing contracts.  
Program Use of Specifications and Standards: Use of specifications and standards listed 
in DOD Instruction 5000.2 is not mandatory for Program Managers. These specifications 
and standards are tools available to the Program Manager, who shall view them as 
guidance, as stated in Section 6-Q of DOD Instruction 5000.2.  
Tiering of Specification and Standards: During production, those system specifications, 
subsystem specifications and equipment/product specifications (through and including the 
first-tier reference in the equipment/product specifications) cited in the contract shall be 
mandatory for use. Lower tier references will be for guidance only, and will not be 
contractually binding unless they are directly cited in the contract. Specifications and 
standards listed on engineering drawings are to be considered as first-tier references. 
Approval of exceptions to this policy may only be made by the Head of the Departmental 
or Agency Standards Improvement Office and the Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion for 
specifications and drawings used in nuclear propulsion plants in accordance with Pub. L. 
98–525 (42 U.S.C. §7158 Note).  
New Directions  
Management and Manufacturing Specifications and Standards: Program Managers 
shall use management and manufacturing specifications and standards for guidance only. 
The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) shall develop a plan for 
canceling these specifications and standards, inactivating them for new designs, 
transferring the specifications and standards to non-government standards, converting 
them to performance-based specifications, or justifying their retention as military 
specifications and standards. The plan shall begin with the ten management and 
manufacturing standards identified in the Report of the Industry Review Panel on 




maximum extent practicable, within two years.  
Configuration Control: To the extent practicable, the Government should maintain 
configuration control of the functional and performance requirements only, giving-
contractors responsibility for the detailed design.  
Obsolete Specifications: The “Department of Defense Index of Specifications and 
Standards” and the “Acquisition Management System and Data Requirements Control 
List” contain outdated military specifications and standards and data requirements that 
should not be used for new development efforts. The Under Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition and Technology) shall develop a procedure for identifying and removing 
these obsolete requirements.  
Use of Non-Government Standards: I encourage the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition and Technology) to form partnerships with industry associations to develop 
non-government standards for replacement of military standards where practicable. The 
Under Secretary shall adopt and list in the “Department of Defense Index of Specifications 
and Standards” (DoDISS) non-government standards currently being used by DOD. The 
Under Secretary shall also establish teams to review the federal supply classes and 
standardization areas to identify candidates for conversion or replacement.  
Reducing Oversight: I direct the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the 
Directors of the Defense Agencies to reduce direct Government oversight by substituting 
process controls and non-government standards in place of development and/or production 
testing and inspection and military-unique quality assurance systems.  
Cultural Changes  
Challenge Acquisition Requirements: Program Managers and acquisition decision 
makers at all levels shall challenge requirements because the problem of unique military 
systems does not begin with the standards. The problem is rooted in the requirements 
determination phase of the acquisition cycle.  
Enhance Pollution Controls: The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the 
Directors of the Defense Agencies shall establish and execute an aggressive program to 
identify and reduce or eliminate toxic pollutants procured or generated through the use of 
specifications and standards.  
Education and Training: The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) 
shall ensure that training and education programs throughout the Department are revised to 
incorporate specifications and standards reform.  
Program Reviews: Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) review of programs at all levels 




oversight process, is being pursued. The MDA (i.e., the Component Acquisition Executive 
or his/her designee, for all but ACAT 1D programs) will be responsible for ensuring that 
progress is being made with respect to programs under his/her cognizance.  
Standards Improvement Executives: The Under Secretary the Secretaries of the Military 
Departments and the Director of the Defense Logistics Agency shall appoint Standards 
Improvement Executives within 30 days. The Standards Improvement Executives shall 
assume the responsibilities of the current Standardization Executives, support those 
carrying out acquisition reform, direct implementation of the military specifications and 
standards reform program, and participate on the Defense Standards Improvement 
Council. The Defense Standards Improvement Council shall be the primary coordinating 
body for the specification and standards program within the Department of Defense and 
shall report directly to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Economic Security). The 
Council shall coordinate with the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition 
Reform) regarding specification and standards reform matters, and shall provide periodic 
progress reports to the Acquisition Reform Senior Steering Group, who will monitor 
overall implementation progress.  
Management Commitment  
This Process Action Team tackled one of the most difficult issues we will face in 
reforming the acquisition process. I would like to commend the team, composed of 
representatives from all of the Military Departments and appropriate Defense Agencies, 
and its leader, Mr. Harold Griffin, for a job well done. In addition, I would like to thank 
the Army, and in particular, Army Materiel Command, for its administrative support of the 
team.  
The Process Action Team’s report and the policies contained in this memorandum are not 
a total solution to the problems inherent in the use of military specifications and standards; 
however, they are a solid beginning that will increase the use of performance and 
commercial specifications and standards. Your leadership and good judgment will be 
critical to successful implementation of this reform. I encourage you and your leadership 
teams to be active participants in establishing the environment essential for implementing 
this cultural change.  
This memorandum is intended only to improve the internal management of the Department 
of Defense and does not create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable 
at law or equity by a party against the Department of Defense or its officers and 
employees.  
                             /signed/ 









APPENDIX B. GAO MEMO 
This memo from the GAO describes the ethics and professional standards that 











APPENDIX C. FAA MEMO 
This memo from the FAA is an advisory in support of the regulations regarding 


















APPENDIX D. SELECTIONS FROM DOD ACQUISITION POLICY 






Item 2 - Selected portion of SECNAVINST 5000.2D, paragraph 7.1.2: 
7.1.2 Quality 
The quality program should ensure the use of best engineering, design, 
manufacturing and management practices that emphasize the prevention of defects. 
Quality should be designed into the product through the systems engineering design 
process to define the product and process quality requirements. Contractors should 
propose a quality management process that meets required program support capabilities. 
The quality management system may be based on the fundamentals described in the ISO-
9001 series supplemented by AS9100, International Aerospace Quality Standard, which 
provide a basic minimum quality management system model.  
Additional advanced quality requirements should be considered for systems based 




maturity, safety, and economics. An advanced quality management system builds on a 
basic quality management system, especially during the design / development phase, by 
identifying critical product and process characteristics, design-to-manufacturing process 
capabilities, design for assembly and manufacturing, design to control process variability, 
process controls, continuous improvements, etc. The quality management approach 
should include an assessment of the contractor’s quality management process and its 
implementation, including those related to assessments or oversight of subcontractors, 
suppliers, and special process facilities (e.g., heat treatment). The quality management 
system should provide timely notification and feedback to contracting and program 
offices in areas such as major and critical deficiencies, potential manufacturing process 
problems, and subcontractor, supplier, or special process facilities problems that 
potentially impact the program. 
 
 
Item 3 - Selected portion of SECNAVINST 5000.2E, paragraph 6.1.2: 
6.1.2 Quality  
A process shall be in place to assure product quality during design, development, 
manufacturing, production, and sustainment. Quality is determined by the extent that 
products and services meet requirements and satisfy the customer at an affordable cost. A 
quality management system should monitor, measure, analyze, control and improve 
processes. Quality practices and quality requirements consistent with program complexity 
and criticality shall be used to assist in reducing risk, assuring quality, and controlling 
costs. 
Reference (f) is a model for quality management systems. Contractors may 
propose alternative systems, as long as they are found technically acceptable by the 
SYSCOM technical authority and accomplish program objectives. 
 
Item 4 – Select portions of the Defense Acquisition System 
DODI 5000.02 policy statements related to manufacturing development with the 
underlined portions added for emphasis: (USD[AT&L] 2015) 
Selection 1 
(d) EMD Phase Completion. The EMD Phase will end when: (1) the 
design is stable; (2) the system meets validated capability requirements 
demonstrated by developmental and initial operational testing as required 
in the TEMP; (3a) manufacturing processes have been effectively 
demonstrated and are under control; (3b) software sustainment processes 
are in place and functioning; (4) industrial production capabilities are 
reasonably available; and (5) the system has met or exceeds all directed 
EMD Phase exit criteria and MS C entrance criteria. EMD will often 
continue past the initial production or fielding decision until all EMD 







(10) MS C 
(a) MS C and the Limited Deployment Decision are the points at which a 
program or increment of capability is reviewed for entrance into the P&D 
Phase or for Limited Deployment. Approval depends in part on specific 
criteria defined at Milestone B and included in the Milestone B ADM. The 
following general criteria will normally be applied: demonstration that the 
production/deployment design is stable and will meet stated and derived 
requirements based on acceptable performance in developmental test 
events; an operational assessment; mature software capability consistent 
with the software development schedule; no significant manufacturing 
risks; a validated Capability Production Document (CPD) or equivalent 
requirements document; demonstrated interoperability; demonstrated 
operational supportability; costs within affordability caps; full funding in 




(12) Full-Rate Production Decision or Full Deployment Decision. The 
MDA will conduct a review to assess the results of initial OT&E, initial 
manufacturing, and limited deployment, and determine whether or not to 
approve proceeding to Full-Rate Production or Full Deployment. 
Continuing into Full-Rate Production or Full Deployment requires 
demonstrated control of the manufacturing process, acceptable 
performance and reliability, and the establishment of adequate sustainment 
and support systems (29). 
 
Selection 4 
Selection 4 comes from the DODI 5000.02 and the SE section found in this 
document’s enclosure 3, paragraph 10 entitled “Manufacturing and Producibility.” The 
DODI5000.02 states: 
During the Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase, program 
managers will assess the maturity of critical manufacturing processes to 
ensure they are affordable and executable. Prior to a production decision, 
the Program Manager will ensure manufacturing and producibility risks 
are acceptable, supplier qualifications are completed, and any applicable 






Naval Air System Command Instruction (NAVAIRINST) in NAVAIRINST 4355.19D, 
(NAVAIR 2008) (underlining for emphasis added): 
The Production Readiness Review (PRR) is an examination of a program 
to determine if the design is ready for production and the producer has 
accomplished adequate production planning without incurring 
unacceptable risks that will breach thresholds of schedule, performance, 
cost, or other established criteria. The full, production-configured system 
is evaluated to determine that it correctly and completely implements all 
system requirements, and whether the traceability of final system 
requirements to the final production system is maintained. At this review 
the IPT shall also review the readiness of the manufacturing 
processes, the Quality System, and the production planning, i.e., 
facilities, tooling and test equipment capacity, personnel development and 
certification, process documentation, inventory management, supplier 
management, etc. A successful review is predicated on the IPT’s 
determination that the system requirements are fully met in the final 
production configuration, and that production capability form a 




Naval Air System Command Instruction (NAVAIRINST) in NAVAIRINST 4355.19E, 
(NAVAIR 2015) 
Criteria PRR: 
Production baseline, Manufacturing, Producibility and Quality 
requirements are producible as verified by the results of the Incremental 
Production Readiness Reviews (iPRR) 
Rationale: 
Ensures that test data indicate readiness for production; ensures the 
specified manufacturing and quality requirements are captured in the 
production plans. 
Selection 7 
DODI 5000.02. See selection 6 and Table 2: 
 
TECHNOLOGY READINESS ASSESSMENT (TRA) 




STATUTORY A preliminary assessment is due for the Development RFP 
Release Decision Point. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research 
and Engineering (ASD(R&E)) will conduct an independent review and 
assessment of the TRA conducted by the Program Manager and other 
factors to determine whether the technology in the program has been 
demonstrated in a relevant environment. The assessment will inform the 
2366b CERTIFICATION MEMORANDUM at Milestone B (in 
accordance with 10 U.S.C. 2366b (Reference (g)). The TRA at MS C is a 










APPENDIX E. DOD TECHNICAL WARRANTS 
The following is a white paper written by William Ireland, at the Naval 
Postgraduate School and submitted on April 2, 2017, in support of his thesis, “Selection 




In the DOD, there is technical authority (TA) that interacts with programmatic 
authority over the life cycle phased weapons systems acquisition process. The manner of 
this interaction is through organizational alignment by competencies. Tomaiko, in his 
2008 thesis, discusses the TA framework within the NAVESEA SYSCOM and the 
development of a new specialized certification. The SYSCOM TA comes from a 
competency-aligned delegation of authority. The effectiveness of introducing a new TA 
is explored:  
In 2006, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and 
Acquisition, ASN (RD&A), mandated the transformation of Naval Sea Systems 
Command (NAVSEA) into a Competency-Aligned Organization (CAO). A CAO fosters 
a competency-based approach to mission performance. A key objective of NAVSEA’s 
new CAO is to improve program management authority and contract authority through 
more effective technical authority. A key challenge facing NAVSEA in establishing a 
new CAO is aligning program management, contract, and technical competencies. This 
will require a common alignment of the engineering workforce across the Navy, as well 
as common policy development and implementation.1 
The TA approach is the subject of SECNAVINST 5400.15C dated September 13, 
2007 and as updated and changed December 2, 2011.2 The organizational construct 
representing TA is defined along technical workforce competencies. These organizational 
constructs are delegated authorities. Each competency is recognized as an authority that 
flows down through its supervisory chain. These chains of authority are further described 
in various policy documents and practices within the respective SYSCOMs. The 
Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) delegates the TA through the operational Navy 
(OPNAV) and the SYSCOMs to lower level experts identified as Technical Warrant 
Holders (TWH) for certain key performance areas. The NAVAIR SYSCOM uses a CAO 
that follows their technical workforce competencies with few actual TWHs while 
NAVSEA SYSCOM follows a more commodity based designation with many TWHs. 
Core beliefs in the technical authorities construct, as discussed by Tomaiko, is 
based on an assumption that asserts that a well behaved process will result in quality 
                                                 
1 IMPROVING THE U.S. NAVY’S EXECUTION OF TECHNICAL AUTHORITY THROUGH A COMMON RISK 
MANAGEMENT AND TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT PROCESS by Thomas Andrew Tomaiko, 2008. 





acquisition outcomes. Enablers of the CAO TA approach is found in required periodic 
training and commitment levied on key acquisition personnel in order to maintain 
continuity of program oversight and execution.  
Practices within certain valued threads of authority, such as safety, requires an 
independent communication path to leadership and milestone decision authorities. 
Typically, there is a reporting of status of significant technical issues to the SYSCOM 
commander. One example of a critical assessment related to safety examines flight 
worthiness. The flight worthiness assessment is a requirement that informs leadership by 
issuing a certificate of conformance or its denial. In this case, the NAVAIR SYSCOM 
conducts gate reviews over an item’s life cycle acquisition development and assures the 
proper certificates are completed prior to Initial Operational Capability (IOC).  
Certifications used to communicate compliance to key performance capabilities is 
based upon the item being able to show compliance objectively to accepted standards and 
reporting policies. SECNAVINST 5400.15 C states the certificate responsibility as 
coming from the CNO / CMC and delegated to the SYSCOMs, PEOs and DRPMs. 
 
Technical, Programmatic and Certification Authority 
Authorities, technical or programmatic, are described in the key policy documents 
defining the requirements for each SYSCOM derived from the SECNAVINST 5400-C, 
dated 2 DEC 2011. The instruction defines TA with its roles and responsibilities. The use 
of the terms that describe the role of a TA and certification follows closely a dictionary 
definition giving the common meaning of warrant. The actual exercise of granting a 
warrant and communicating compliance requires standards that show required adherence 
evidence in order to adjudicate a specific certification’s requirements. Those involved in 
the technical and programmatic authority chain are responsible for issuing and 
communicating any warrant to decision makers. Refer to the definitions of authorities in 
DOD acquisition and the general meaning of warrant: 
 
Definition 1:  
(3) Technical authority (TA). TA is the authority, responsibility, and 
accountability to establish, monitor and approve technical standards, tools, and 
processes in conformance with applicable Department of Defense (DOD) and 
DON policy, requirements, architectures, and standards. 
 
Definition 2:  
Technical authority is the authority, responsibility and accountability to establish, 
monitor and approve technical products and processes are in conformance to 
higher authority policy, requirements, architectures and standards.  
Programmatic authorities manage all aspects of assigned programs from concept 
to disposal, including oversight of cost, schedule and performance, and direction 
of life cycle management.  
Certification authority is a special case of technical authority where there is 
authority to certify that products meet established standards. Specific certification 
authority is defined by the technical process documentation established by the 






Select portions for the definition of “warrant”3  
war·rant (wôr′ənt, wŏr′-) n. 
 
Something that provides assurance or confirmation; a guarantee or proof 
 
Authorization or certification; sanction, as given by a superior. 
a. A warrant officer. 
b. A certificate of appointment given to a warrant officer. 
 
To capture briefly the dual role of a TWH there is the definition of a technical 
authority as associated to a workforce competency or office and the reporting of 
compliance to technical standards for key performance areas with certification or 
warrants: 
 
Technical Warrant Holder: Significant delegated chain of authorities to a lead 
office/officer. 
 
Certification or Warrant Process: Actions that lead to documenting compliance to 
the related authority and resultant certification or warrant granted within the 
domain of the authority. 
 
Types of Technical Authority as Warrant Holders 
With respect to types of authorities in this discussion is the TA that is delegated. 
Consider the SECNAVINST 5400.15C: 
 
The SYSCOM Commanders are responsible for: providing for in-service support; 
providing support services to PEOs and DRPMs without duplicating their management 
functions; and serving as the technical authority and operational safety and assurance 
certification authorities for their assigned areas of responsibility. 
 
 As a practical matter, this delegation of TA is conferred to certain Chief Systems 
Engineers (CSEs) or the SYSCOM’s Chief Engineer (CHENG) by the commanders of 
the SYSCOMS to:  
 
“(5) Exercise Technical Authority and certification authority for weapon and IT 
systems.”  
 
One example of delegated TA is from the NAVAIR SYSCOM, where the 
CHENG for aviation manages the aviation baseline for Ship Design Managers (SDMs). 
In another case, the Cost Engineering Managers (CEMs) ensure independent cost 
                                                 





engineering and estimating in support of Navy programs. Lastly, there is the Technical 
Area Expert (TAE) acting under the top CHENG as the Navy’s expert in the assigned 
technical domain (e.g. NAVAIR - Air Vehicles; NAVSEA – Shipboard Pumps). Further, 
there have been Technical Process Owners (TPOs) who provide definition and 
documentation for the assigned technical processes (e.g. NAVAIR - Air Worthiness 
Certification). NAVSEA will define Waterfront and Depot Chief Engineers (CHENGs) 
and lead the technical efforts of the SYSCOMs from the waterfront and depots. 
 
Technical Authority Policy and Manufacturing Competency  
TA, as it applies to NAVAIR, NAVSEA, SPAWAR, NAVFAC, and NAVSUP, is 
derived by DOD TA policy that defines various types of Technical Warrant Holders 
(TWH). There are specific policies and instructions that define the roles for these 
technical, programmatic and certification authorities within the SYSCOMs. First, a TA is 
conferred upon through a competency office holder or individual who is considered a 
Technical Warrant Holder (TWH).  
The TWH is chartered with establishing specific policy for resolving conflicts on 
technical decisions within their domain of delegated expertise and oversight 
responsibility. In addition, these authorities are assigned to support DOD acquisition to 
assure products meet requirements and obtain any necessary certifications and approvals 
to advance a product’s development through the various gated technical reviews over the 
DOD life cycle acquisition phases. As stated in the OPNAV Instruction (OPNAVINST 
5450.350), this TA is deployed to the NAVAIRSYSCOM stating the TWH 
responsibility:4  
 
(5) Exercise Technical Authority and life cycle management for assigned 
programs and oversee core processes, operational safety, and assurance 
certification required to support the acquisition, in-service support, and disposal 
of weapon and IT systems. 
In addition, the OPNAV INST confirms the relation to a competency as long as it 
is not chartered to another organization in the requirement stating: 
(b) Management of shore activities, industrial management of depot maintenance 
activities, administration of DOD policies on manufacturing methods and 
technology and metrication; 
 
Technical Authority for Manufacturing in DOD Acquisition 
The SYSCOMS are similar to one-another in their application of TA within their 
respective CAO structures. The NAVAIR TA for manufacturing is derived from the 
systems engineering competency. The NAVAIR CHENG further delegates the TA for 
manufacturing to the division head of the Manufacturing and Quality organization as the 
workforce expertise for manufacturing. In this chain of authority, representing 
specifically the TA for manufacturing, the instruction does not identify a requirement for 
certification to warrant a contractor’s readiness to produce. When a warrant or 
certification of compliance is defined within the TA there are associated standards and 
                                                 




requirements that must be satisfied representing a key performance area. However, for 
Manufacturing and Quality it has fallen short of being a key performance area requiring 
certification. There are no standards related to manufacturing or a production readiness 
decision requiring a certification for production approval in the DOD acquisition. This 
lack of a standard manner to demonstrate process capability was observed by the GAO 
report on “Select Weapon Systems reporting that there was a lack of a standard approach 
for contractor’s compliance for production readiness. A standard would be needed for 
production readiness if process capability would become a key performance area for TA 
certification. 
Current approval for production, in the NAVSEA case, acquisition practices 
follow a technical review process providing technical ownership across commodities of 
interest for its production readiness oversight. Presently, in NAVSEA, there are about 
250 different specific TWHs representing particular commodities. In the NAVAIR case, 
the acquisition review process relies upon an approach that assesses an end item’s 
Production Readiness Review (PRR). The technical review process at PRR uses 
relatively few TWHs associated with workforce competencies, relying primarily on the 
TWH for manufacturing as to reviewing and reporting of risk with respect to production 
readiness.  
In either case, the technical assessments of production readiness occur prior to 
Milestone C’s production decision. At MS C, a programmatic authority will then report if 
there are any significant manufacturing risks to decision authorities in a program’s 
capabilities production document (CPD) given to the MDA. While there is a Production 
Readiness Review used to report readiness risk, there are no policies, instructions or 
standards of compliance within the DOD manufacturing competency that could be used 
to certify, with a warrant, such readiness.  
It is important to note that the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), through the chain 
of Technical Authorities, identified “Manufacturing,” Integrated Logistics Support and 
T&E as equals in its instruction and guidance but only the manufacturing domain does 
not require a warrant as evidence demonstrating a compliance for readiness. The 
manufacturing performance area for oversight, by a TWH, was taken from the 
SECNAVINST 5400.15C dated September 2007:  
 
(1) Oversee the core processes required to support the acquisition, in-service 
support, and disposal of weapon and IT systems. Core processes include: (a) 
Realistic and reasonable cost estimating; (b) Technology development and 
technical readiness assessment; (c) Systems engineering (acquisition and in-
service) and development, including Environment, Safety and Occupational 
Health (ESOH) management; (d) Manufacturing; (e) Test and evaluation; (f) ILS 
(acquisition and in-service); (g) Installation; (h) Maintenance and modernization 
planning; (i) Configuration management; 
 
In the current instruction, 2 December 2011 release, the manufacturing thread is 
somewhat ambiguous to TA delegation and oversight responsibility. On the other hand, 
technical readiness of an item relies upon qualification testing that demonstrates key 




example is the Technological Readiness Level (TRL) required by public law requiring a 
TRL level 6 prior to EMD.5 Additional functional performance verification prior to 
production often requires a demonstration of functional requirements under qualification 
testing and Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E). Representative functional 
performance requirements and certifications are required to be documented in order to 
satisfy a production decision leading to Initial Operation Capability (IOC) and will 
include special certifications related to that end item.  
Requirements, in the MRL and PRR sense, are not under certification reporting 
and there is no warrant to report readiness compliance demonstrating a production 
system’s process capability. One aspect of the 2 December 2011 change to the 
SECNAVINST 5400.15 that shows the technical manufacturing thread in the TA 
obligation removed: 
 
(1) Exercise management authority, including selection and application, over 
core capabilities that support the SECNAVINST 5400.15C acquisition, in-service 
support, and disposal of assigned weapons and IT systems. These capabilities 
include: (a) Business and financial management; (b) Life cycle logistics; (c) Test, 
evaluation and certification; (d) Technology evaluation(s); (e) Systems 
engineering (including ESOH management); (f) Installation, maintenance, and 
modernization; (g) Configuration management; and (h) Demilitarization and 
disposal. 
 
When contrasting the DOD production readiness practices, to the automotive 
industry, one finds the automobile industry uses a model of compliance requiring a 
manufacturing readiness / production readiness defined by a certificated warrant process 
for production approval. Other industries, such as FDA and the FAA, all require a 
producer to demonstrate production readiness knowledge prior to production 
commitment by issuing a warrant as part of a Production part approval process (PPAP). 
The notion of issuing a certification that warrants a demonstrated capable production 
process is not a structure in the DOD CAO. As a model, the PPAP is a long standing best 
practice in the automotive industry and serves as a key performance area standard. The 
GAO 013 report was in support of creating a production readiness standard for DOD 
production approval, stating there is a need to look at process capability demonstration in 
a standardized manner.6 In 2010, this process of certification for production readiness 
was also recommended for use in the DOD by the National Defense Industrial 
Association (NDIA) (NDIA 2010, p19).7 Consider what is said by Tomaiko with regards 
to the need to develop and standardize the TA process on interoperability in DOD 
acquisition - Quoted directly (Tomaiko, 2008): 
 
                                                 
5 Manual for the Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) 
6 Defense Acquisitions - Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. RTC  (Report No. GAO-13-294SP) Washington, 
DC: General Accountability Office, 2013. 
7 NDIA Gulf Coast Chapter, 2010. Acquisition Excellence through Effective Systems Engineering; Systems Engineering 




This thesis achieved its purpose of improving execution of Technical Authority by 
defining the relationship between program authority and Technical Authority and 
describing how to assess and improve the state of Technical Authority through 
common policy development and implementation. Still, more work needs to be 
done. Future research necessary to help the SYSCOMs implement a common risk 
management process includes development and deployment of an Integrated 
Assessment Tool (IAT). Future research also needs to include promulgating a 
common policy for developing Systems Engineering Plans, a common technical 
review process, a common total platform and interoperability certification 
process, and a common systems engineering training program. 
 
In the case brought by Tomaiko, a more effective TA process was desired for the 
key performance area of interoperability. Fortunately, the TA on interoperability 
followed the recommendation discussed by Tomaiko. Now there is a complete 
certification process improvement in practice. Compliance for the certificated 
Interoperability requirements are given in the Interoperability Process Guide, dated 10 
September 2012. The guide is managed by the Defense Information Systems Agency 
(DISA).8 
 
Rationale for a DOD PPAP Warrant / Certificate 
The automotive industry production approval process observes a stable 
commercial best practice giving acquisition oversight assuring a production part is ready 
to start production based on a set of PPAP standards. In the commercial case, a PPAP 
warrant holder represents that a production system of interest produces parts meeting 
requirements. This process is applied throughout an entire supply network in the exact 
same manner. The PPAP can be assembled from a bottom-up approach providing 
consistent evidence of compliance.  
The automotive industry has relied upon the PPAP as a performance of a 
disciplined systems engineering application to the manufacturing development process 
and production ready demonstration. The PPAP warrant process is flowed from the 
original equipment manufacturer down to the lowest level supplier prior to production 
approval. A review of one reference in DOD guidance issued by the NAVAIR SYSCOM 
in the NAVAIRINST 4355.19D one finds that the instruction considered a very limited 
view of certification associated only to personnel in support of production readiness.9 
There was attention to functional performance demonstration and production process 
readiness and planning (highlighted selections by the author). Production capability was 
to be assured at PRR. The requirements do not develop any description of what is meant 
by a “satisfactory basis for determining readiness.” If it was to be from objective 
manufacturing requirements demonstrated, no such production capability requirements 
are shown to be required. Reference the quote from NAVAIRINST: 
 
                                                 
8 Interoperability Process Guide, Version 1.0, dated 10 September 2012, Defense Information Systems Agency 




The Production Readiness Review (PRR) is an examination of a program to 
determine if the design is ready for production and the producer has 
accomplished adequate production planning without incurring unacceptable risks 
that will breach thresholds of schedule, performance, cost, or other established 
criteria. The full, production-configured system is evaluated to determine that it 
correctly and completely implements all system requirements, and whether the 
traceability of final system requirements to the final production system is 
maintained. At this review the IPT shall also review the readiness of the 
manufacturing processes, the Quality System, and the production planning, i.e., 
facilities, tooling and test equipment capacity, personnel development and 
certification, process documentation, inventory management, supplier 
management, etc. A successful review is predicated on the IPT’s determination 
that the system requirements are fully met in the final production configuration, 
and that production capability form a satisfactory basis for proceeding into 
LRIP and FRP, p. 124. 
 
In the current NAVAIRINST 4355.19E, the PRR requirements related to 
production and manufacturing readiness do not include a “basis of satisfaction” to be 
determined towards a production capability. The writers of version D anticipated some 
“basis of satisfaction” to be determined or assured but did not go as far as requiring an 
objective demonstration or certification as recommended by the NDIA in 2010. 
Reference the table on PRR requirements from NAVAIRINST 4355.19E:10 
 
Criteria PRR Rationale 
c. Production baseline, Manufacturing, Producibility 
and Quality requirements are producible as verified 
by the results of the Incremental Production 
Readiness Reviews (iPRR) 
Ensures that test data indicate readiness for 
production; ensures the specified manufacturing and 
quality requirements are captured in the production 
plans. 
 
In the DOD technical review process, there is a system engineering review 
establishing a stable and manufacturable design at the Critical Design Review (CDR). 
The subsequent PRR review is the technical review leading to production start at MS C. 
The CDR and PRR reviews are conducted to ensure that functional test data and 
manufacturing risk indicate readiness. The specified manufacturing and quality readiness, 
that span CDR and PRR, rely solely upon manufacturing and quality planning and not on 
production capability that had a basis of being satisfied in the earlier version of the 
instruction. With a focus on the manufacturing review requirements, the CDR and PRR 
are simply defined: 
 
CDR: 
System and subsystem level analyses of producibility, manufacturing process, and 
process controls, [in] support [of] the product baseline 
 
                                                 





Ensures that contractors have processes and process controls in place to 
manufacture systems per the product baseline 
PRR: 
Product baseline, manufacturing, producibility and quality requirements are 
producible as verified by the results of the incremental production readiness 
reviews (IPRR- without a special definition) 
 
Summary of Technical Authority Discussion in Manufacturing 
The manufacturing solution that historically led the automotive industry to devise 
one standard approach for a PPAP warrant was the industry’s response to poor 
automotive production outcomes in the 80’s and foreign competition. This is similar to 
the GAO’s findings that reported poor production outcomes, in the DOD, due to a lack of 
standard and demonstrated process capability at MS C. The need for a common approach 
for the automotive OEMs limited a proliferation of OEM standards that were a burden on 
the supply network. A common approach emerged that employed a set of prescriptive 
quality guidelines and a production approval requirement standard. These prescriptive 
standards were deployed with four overlapping activities called advanced product quality 
planning (APQP).11  
The APQP is used to guide best practices in the development of a manufacturing 
process. If this approach would be applied, within the DOD acquisition and TA 
constructs, it would serve to significantly reduce time and costs that are hard to assess 
with the endless different readiness approaches taken by contractors and their suppliers. 
One common approach would streamline and enhance production oversight and be able 
to use the PPAP standard for a certification warrant to realize quality improvement. The 




Advanced Manufacturing – Prototype (where critical characteristics were 
identified) & Production Planning through final equipment validation (facilities 
planning & execution / equipment & process including sub-tier entity oversight – 
all PPAP) early process prove-out – (relied upon process potential).  
 
PPAP  
Transitions from the development phase to the production phase by a warranted 
production readiness demonstration. Customer acceptance (relied upon process 
capability – where critical characteristics were controlled).  
 
The PPAP serves as the evidence of readiness to produce and is conducted prior 
to production. The PPAP is a handshake from advanced manufacturing to plant 
operations. A simplification of the PPAP requirement: a production part that meets 
functional requirements, has been manufacturing from a defined production environment, 
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is produced under manufacturing controls, is run at production rates, parts show statistical 
a demonstrated capability and thereby assure production readiness at production start.  
 
Benefits of the PPAP Warrant Process Surveyed 
Surveys in the late 1990s by the American Society of Quality and McGraw-Hill 
allowed a comparison of the prescriptive quality systems known as the QS 9000 quality 
standards and the ISO 9000 quality standards (including AS9100) (ISO 9000 was 
common to DOD acquisition).12 The prescriptive standards of the automotive industry 
revealed compelling evidence that the knowledge-based approach demonstrating process 
capability was superior to non-prescriptive quality standards based on the ISO 9000 
series alone. The automotive prescriptive quality system achieved at least 50% 
improvement 50% of the time based on reduced scrap, improved reliability and improved 
profits. The ISO 9000 family of quality standards showed that only 6% of respondents 
improved quality by adherence to the standards.1314  
 
Aerospace Standard - AS 9145 
The success of the automotive industry best practices, of APQP and PPAP, had 
not gone unnoticed and is the reason why there is a new aerospace standard, released 
11/2016, to adopt the APQP and the PPAP, reference SAE – AS9145.15 The APQP and 
PPAP are processes that show a solution space that has demonstrated success for over 25 
years as a best practice in the automotive industry and has been largely adopted by the 
FAA and the FDA. Therefore, there is a need to develop a certification process for 
process capability, as a key performance area, in the DOD using the CAO and the TA 
construct to close the manufacturing knowledge gap reported by the GAO. This would 
close the knowledge gap in manufacturing tied to poor production outcomes from given 
the current lack of standard disciplined demonstration of process capability prior to 
production start.  
 
Conclusion 
The success of the automotive approach relies upon a third party consortium - 
Automotive Industry Action Group (AIAG). The AIAG has trained and maintained the 
knowledge base over the entire supply network on behalf of OEMs since the early 1990s. 
This success of APQP and PPAP has been given stature for consideration as a 
prescriptive standard for the aerospace industry by the Society of Automotive Engineers. 
The significantly more prescriptive standard AS9145 with certification warrant is now 
proposed by the Society of Automotive Engineers on behalf of the aerospace industry 
                                                 
12 Naveh, Eitan, Alfred Marcus, and Hyoung Koo Moon. 1999. ISO 9000 Cost - Benefit Survey. Quality management 
systems Update and Plexus Corporation, New York: McGraw-Hill Inc. 
13 AIAG/ASQ. Quality Survey Results. Survey Workshop, Novi: Automotive Industry Action Group/American 
Society of Quality, 1997. 
14 AIAG. 1998. 1998 Annual Quality Survey Report. Survey, Southfield: Automotive Industry Action Group. 
15 Society of Automotive Engineers. 2015. Advanced Product Quality Planning (APQP) / Production Part Approval 
Process (PPAP). Issuing: G-14 Americas Aerospace Quality Standards Committee SAE International. Host: SAE.org 





because that standards body recognized the superior production outcomes over the use of 
the ISO and AS9100 quality systems standards. 
Therefore, this paper urges the adaptation of APQP and PPAP for DOD 
acquisition process improvement identifying Production Readiness as a key performance 
area requiring a certification warrant at MS C. These standards and guidelines for quality 
and manufacturing readiness are able to be applied within the framework of the Code of 
Federal Regulations but would need the DOD to update their policy and guidance with 









APPENDIX F. DEALING WITH MULTIPLE QMS 
When there is more than one quality management system, to satisfy multiple 
customer requirements, a supplier may adopt an approach that addresses each. This can 
occur when they serve customers that cross industries such as FAA, FDA and automotive 
that has industry specific standards for their quality management approach. If a supplier 
serves a DOD contractor, then there are unique requirements that, in general, follow 
either ISO 9000 or AS 9000 requirements for Quality Management Systems. One quality 
system may try to satisfy all such standards by a consolidation approach first addressing 
the common requirements of ISO 9000 and then with additional requirements treated in 
some unique manner such as: 
 
 
The Company Quality Management System shall meet the requirements of the 
International Standard ISO-9001:2008. 
 
 Additional, for products sold to automotive application, the company quality 
management system shall comply with the requirements of the ISO/TS 16949 standard, as 
it appears in italic type with a (TS) preceding the statement. 
 
 Additional, for products sold as an aerospace application, the company quality 
management system shall comply with the requirements of the AS-9100 standard, as it 
appears in italic type with an (AS) preceding the statement.  
 
 









APPENDIX G. DOD MEMO TO GAO 
This memo from the DOD to the GAO is an example response to the findings of a 














APPENDIX H. CFR, TITLE 48, 46.202.4 
Code of Federal Regulations  
 
FAR Part 46 
 
Code of Federal Regulations, title 48, 46.202.4 is the Federal Acquisition Regulations 
(FAR) for Higher-level contract quality requirements 46.202-4. 
 
eCFR Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, 2015. 
 
48CFR46.202.4(2015) 
Date accessed 8/2/15 
 














Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) annual edition is the codification of the general and 
permanent rules published in the Federal Register by the departments and agencies of the 
Federal Government produced by the Office of the Federal Register (OFR) and the 

















Higher-level quality standards - All government quality assurance requirements are 
spelled out in Part 46 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).  
 
Any language that you will see in a bid or contract related to quality control consists of 
clauses extracted from this Part.  
 
When a contract is for complex or critical items, higher-level requirements are applicable.  
 
The contracting officer is responsible for identifying the higher-level standard(s) that will 
satisfy the government’s requirement. 
 
Title 48 → Chapter 1 → Subchapter G → Part 46 → Subpart 46.2 → §46.202-4 
 
Higher-level quality standards 46.202-4Higher-level contract quality requirements. 
 
(a) Agencies shall establish procedures for determining when higher-level contract 
quality requirements are necessary, for determining the risk (both the likelihood and the 
impact) of nonconformance, and for advising the contracting officer about which higher-
level standards should be applied and included in the solicitation and contract. Requiring 
compliance with higher-level quality standards is necessary in solicitations and contracts 
for complex or critical items (see 46.203) or when the technical requirements of the 
contract require— 
 
(1) Control of such things as design, work operations, in-process controls, testing, and 
inspection; or 
 
(2) Attention to such factors as organization, planning, work instructions, documentation 
control, and advanced metrology. 
 
(b) Examples of higher-level quality standards include overarching quality management 
system standards such as ISO 9001, ASQ/ANSI E4, ASME NQA-1, SAE AS9100, SAE 






[79 FR 70347, Nov. 25, 2014, as amended at 80 FR 4994, Jan. 29, 2015] 
 
Quality Requirements May Apply for Subcontractors 
 
(Applicable to complex or critical items; contracts may be for less than $100,000). 
 
You may be thinking to yourself, “If I am just a subcontractor, I won’t have to do all this 
quality stuff, will I?” Guess again. In many instances, a prime contractor will find it 
necessary or desirable to pass along the quality requirements to the subcontractor. Why? 
The prime contractor is responsible for the quality of materials supplied by the 
subcontractors or suppliers, and it is in its best interest to assure that all suppliers are 
capable of providing the materials and meeting the quality requirements of the prime 
contract. 
 
The only way that the prime can assure itself that you can do quality work, on time and 
within budget, is to inspect your systems and get them approved. The day of the “pal” or 
“buddy” at the prime level that will issue a contract just on an owner’s assurance that the 
company can deliver the required product is becoming a thing of the past. Many a small 
business that had this type of relationship has found, to their woe, that it must still have 
some kind of quality control system in place. So you must market your company in ways 
that you might not have had to before. 
 
To the surprise of many contractors and subcontractors, government contract quality 
assurance at the subcontractor level does not relieve the prime contractor of any 
responsibilities under the contract nor does it establish a contractual relationship between 
the government and the subcontractor. So, if you think that you are getting out of some of 
the quality “stuff” by being a sub, think again. 
 
The prime might, under a special exception or for a particular job, let you slide by 
without a QA program for a while, but it will eventually want to see a formal program in 
place or it won’t want to work with you. Therefore, you may as well start creating your 
own program now, and do it to your satisfaction, without having the pressure of having to 









APPENDIX I. FDA PROCEDURES, PREMARKET APPROVAL 
This item represents specific FDA regulatory guidance documents for selected 
medical devices and their respective production part approval process—










APPENDIX J. FAA PRODUCTION APPROVAL PROCESS 
These selections represent specific regulatory guidance from the FAA for 
production part approval certifications showing the PMA process flow chart and then the 







FAA – Aviation Production Approval, FAA.gov – FAR Part 21; ISO 9000/ AS 







APPENDIX K. MOP RATIONALE AND WEIGHTING FACTORS 
The following table provides detailed measure of performance rationale used in 
the analysis of alternatives concerning various industry best practices and then a 
summary of the weighting criteria applied to each of the six identified key items. 
 
 
Evaluation Category: Manufacturing Knowledge gaps and Associated  
Measures of Performance Category with Best Practice Rationale 
Item             MOP                      ---------- Rationale ---------- 
1. Quality 
Systems 
Objective MOP  Best Practice Rationale 
QMS, APQP & 
PPAP w/ 3rd 
Party Compliance  
1.1. QMS - ISO 
9000/ AS9100 / 
ISO/TS 16949  
Formal Quality Management System maintained by 
producer, a) adjudged to be compliant by an auditor 
internal or DCMA or b) 3rd party registration. 
Prescriptive quality systems are superior to general 






Advanced product quality planning: Consensus 
Standard, Guidelines are superior to unique planning 
processes. This is acknowledged in the aerospace 
standard AS 9145 that is to supplant less disciplined 




Production part approval process: Consensus Standard, 
Required in Automotive Industry and the subject of a 
pending aerospace standard AS 9145. Certification or 
Warrant Issued prior to production demonstrating 
production capability is superior to production approval 
based on risk models. 
2. Requirements  Objective MOP  Best Practice Rationale 
Product & 





Common standards precede best practice training. 
Institutional training external is preferred above 
internal as variation is reduced. The absence of 





Evaluation Category: Manufacturing Knowledge gaps and Associated  
Measures of Performance Category with Best Practice Rationale 




Manufacturing development best practices requires a 
standard disciplined approach. If there are prescriptive 
external standards they are superior to heuristic non-
standard practices of development. 
2.3. Warrant 
Approach - PPAP 
Production approval is warranted by a qualified agent. 
A Standard approach to PPAP is superior to ad-hoc 
processes. Demonstration prior to production approval 





Product Design Failure Modes and Effects Analysis to 
the component level are superior to functional level. 
Process Failure Modes and Effects Analysis to the 
process step with controls for causes are superior. 
Causes need to be actionable not being able to ask why 
any further. Process is used to identify key 




Measurement Systems must be calibrated, repeatable, 
have high reliability and suitable to the item tolerance. 
A rule of thumb is to have error be less than 1/10th the 
tolerance. Error is used to create error bands inside 




Control - SPC) 
Purposefully and statistically define, manage and 
interpret key process parameters using SPC. Process 
must show that it is firs stable and in control. 





3.1. PDR, CDR 
% Drawings 
Completed 
Product Development practices assures technologies 
are mature, designs are stable. One measure is percent 
of drawings released. (Example: 85% at PDR and 
100% at CDR). Another measure is having drawing 
standards that use geometric tolerances. Having high 
skill reviews helps to remove ambiguity and outside 





Evaluation Category: Manufacturing Knowledge gaps and Associated  
Measures of Performance Category with Best Practice Rationale 
Item             MOP                      ---------- Rationale ---------- 
3.2. Drawing 
Controls CM 
Configuration control is important to a technical data 
package defining the design record. The same care 
applied to the manufacturing process definition is a 
superior best practice. 




Once design characteristics are understood and key 
characteristics identified, robust design use parameter 
design experimentation as a best practices to 
understand complex tolerances, finds interactions, and 





3.4. Not Stable: 
Pp Ppk >= 1.33 - 
LRIP 
If a new process has not demonstrated statistical 
stability or homogeneity for manufacturing or 
fabrication then determining a processes potential Ppk 
is applied as a best practices.  
3.5. Stable: Cpk 
>= 1.67 - FRP 
If a more mature process has demonstrated statistical 
stability and homogeneity for a manufacturing process 





3.6. Product & 
Process 
Maturation 
Manufacturing readiness level assessment Conducted 
or Manufacturing Process Matured in Development. A 
best practice is to use a knowledge-based approach as 
compared to a risk-based approach showing evidence 
of the maturation. Using an actual production line 






When inspection, test or field failure occurs then a 
disciplined corrective action process begins to prevent 
recurrence. FMEAs are updated and Non-recurrence is 
monitored. A closed loop corrective action system is a 




After FMEAS are completed then using Risk Priority 
Numbers that guide improvement recommendations to 
achieve higher quality systems is a best practice.  





Evaluation Category: Manufacturing Knowledge gaps and Associated  
Measures of Performance Category with Best Practice Rationale 









This guide assists in the assessment of a measurement 





Procedure & First 
Article Inspection 
and Test 
Product functional requirements that demonstrate 
product performance and reliability are part of 
verification of a compliant system. Dimensional 
compliance that follows AS9102 periodically assessed 




Variables - SPC 
Following an SPC reference guide that provides a wide 
range of statistical methods for effective monitoring 
and control of manufacturing processes is a best 
practice. 
4.4. Supply 
Network - APQP 
Manufacturing development best practices requires a 
standard disciplined approach. If there are prescriptive 
external standards then they are superior to heuristic 
non-standard practices for development of 
manufacturing. Supplier requirements for APQP and 
Control Plan guide are a best practice that streamlines 
the quality & manufacturing process control approach 
in support of a development program.  
4.5. Supply 
Network - FMEA 
This guide assists in the assessment of a design or a 
process that supports eliminating or reducing the effects 
of failure modes identified. Product Design Failure 
Modes and Effect Analysis to the component level are 
superior to functional level. Process Failure Modes and 
Effects Analysis to the process step with controls for 
causes are superior. Causes need to be actionable not 
being able to ask why any further. Process is used to 





Evaluation Category: Manufacturing Knowledge gaps and Associated  
Measures of Performance Category with Best Practice Rationale 
Item             MOP                      ---------- Rationale ---------- 
4.6. Supply 
Network - MSA 
This guide assists in the assessment of a measurement 
system that supports engineering and manufacturing 
process. Measurement Systems must be calibrated, 
repeatable, have high reliability and suitable to the item 
tolerance. A rule of thumb is to have error be less than 
1/10th the tolerance. Error is used to create error bands 
inside design tolerance limits. 
4.7. Supply 
Network - SPC  
This guide describes how SPC provides a wide range of 
statistical methods for effective monitoring and control 
of manufacturing processes. Purposefully and 
statistically define, manage and interpret key process 
parameters using SPC. Process must show that it is firs 
stable and in control. 
4.8. Supply 
Network - PPAP 
The supply network is required to comply with the 
requirements of the PPAP. Consistent quality is 
demonstrated in an actual production run at production 
rates. The Production part approval process integrates 
production readiness including the design, 
qualification, process capability with a certification 
warrant. 










Field failures in development, qualification, field test 
should be following a failure reporting and corrective 
action system. Problems could be design or 
manufacturing. Having cross functional teams review 
failure items should help identify root cause and 
mitigate the problems as a best practice. Reliability 











Evaluation Category: Manufacturing Knowledge gaps and Associated  
Measures of Performance Category with Best Practice Rationale 
Item             MOP                      ---------- Rationale ---------- 
5.3. Yield / Scrap 
Metrics - Targets 
- Achievements 
Processes should have a full complement of metrics 
that establish targets, measure and monitor results and 
report to management. Best Practice quality metrics 
help identify causes for shortcomings and have 
executive leadership involved in the management of the 
improvement processes. 
5.4. Lean / Six 
Sigma Results - 
DIMAC 
Six-sigma is a data driven analysis process that 
quantifies problems and improvement change process. 
A best practice uses six-sigma to eliminate waste at the 
enterprise level of management as a best practice. 




Design Requirements have been defined and the 
configured baseline has been tested in field usage 
conditions demonstrating those requirements. A best 





Post production field usage data is maintained for items 
that fail in the field. Items manage durability risk 
through warranty. The post production data is used to 
confirm or improve reliability over time as a best 
practice, particularly for durable goods. 
5.7. Things Gone 
Wrong (TGW) / 
Right (TGR) 
Customer feedback is actively understood by user 
and internal data streams using items like surveys, 
warranties, peer reviews and lessons learned. There is 
an active activity to use these feedback systems to 
identify TGW and TGR to improve product and 
process performance at the Enterprise and project levels 
as a best practice. 





Evaluation Category: Manufacturing Knowledge gaps and Associated  
Measures of Performance Category with Best Practice Rationale 










Cost of Quality metrics is defined at the enterprise level 
and is a best practice. Quality metrics are financial and 
product related and are aligned to prevention, appraisal 
and failure activities (both internal and external). An 
ABC cost accounting practice is aligned to PAF at the 
local project level is a best practice. 






Cost of Quality metrics is defined at the local level and 
is a best practice. Quality metrics are financial and 
product related and are aligned to prevention, appraisal 
and failure activities (both internal and external). An 
ABC cost accounting practice is aligned to PAF at the 
local project level is a best practice. 
6.3 PAF Model 
of Quality 
Improvement 
3. PAF Managed 
Cost of Quality metrics including prevention, appraisal 
and failure activities (both internal and external) are 
used to influence product improvements and ROI by 





Enterprise level sales performance can be traced to 
product performance over time and can be related to 
quality economics as a best practice. ROI are related to 
improvement actions and can be readily determined 
based on item performance and from internal actions, 
field activity or warranty systems. 
6.5. Market Share 
Performance 
Enterprise and local level understanding of market 
share is known and related to Enterprise and project 
performance. Effects of Quality Economics can be 









APPENDIX L. LINKS TO QUALITY PRACTICES 
A standard Google search was made to identify any relevant links to quality 
management systems that use a Production Part Approval Process (PPAP).  The United 
Technologies Corporation (UTC) was one organization identified as noted in this 
selection. 
 
I. UTC Production-part-approval-process (UPPAP) 
www.utc.com/Suppliers/Documents/asqr09_2.pdf 
Production-part-approval-process (PPAP) ... property of United Technologies 
Corporation (UTC). You may not possess, use, copy or disclose this document or any 
• [PDF] 
II. UPPAP Basics issued: 1–13-2016 - United … 
supplierdiversity.utc.com/Suppliers/Documents/ppap_asqr09_2_faq.pdf 
United Technologies Corporation Farmington, CT 06032 UPPAP FAQ UPPAP Basics 
issued: 1–13-2016 What is UPPAP? The UPPAP process is used to ensure that parts ... 
III. • UPPAP Toolbox | Suppliers | United Technologies 
www.utc.com/Suppliers/Pages/UPPAP-Toolbox.aspx 
Download documents in the UPPAP Toolbox. ... We are a company founded by people 
who invented technologies, turned them into businesses and, through innovation, built ... 
• [PDF] 
IV. TITLE UTC Production-part-approval-process (UPPAP) 
utcaerospacesystems.com/sites/kiddeaerospace/Documents/asqr09_2... 
which produces parts for a United Technologies Corporation (UTC) Member Company. 
... Note: UPPAP is modeled after AIAG’s PPAP (Production-part-approval-process… 
• [PDF] 
V. SUPPLIER QUALITY MANUAL Exhibit 1 
https://files.ccs.utc.com/ccs/en/worldwide/contentimages/SQM-BIS... 
Further the SQM applies to internal suppliers within United Technologies ... PPAP 
submission should be made as far in advance of production start-up as possible, ... 
• [PDF] 
VI. Process Sheets / Supplier ... - United Technologies 
utc.aws-stage.com/Suppliers/Documents/asqr09_1.pdf 
Business Entities need not be re-submitted, for new approval, until such time ... 
Unpublished Work - © UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION 2012 
VII. • Home | UTC Aerospace Systems 
utcaerospacesystems.com/Pages/Default.aspx 
UTC Aerospace Systems provides innovative aerospace technologies and integrated 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
153 
 
APPENDIX M. MRL LEVELS 6 TO 10 
This selection describing the MRL levels 6 to 10 are directly taken from the 
OSD’s MRL Deskbook, version 2.3. 
 
Manufacturing Readiness Level (MRL) Deskbook 
Version 2.3 
May 2015 
Prepared by the OSD Manufacturing Technology Program 




MRL 6: Capability to produce a prototype [parts] in a production relevant environment 
 
This MRL is associated with readiness for a Milestone B decision to initiate an acquisition 
program by entering into the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) Phase of 
acquisition. Technologies should have matured to at least TRL 6. It is normally seen as the level 
of manufacturing readiness that denotes acceptance of a preliminary system design. An initial 
manufacturing approach has been developed. The majority of manufacturing processes have been 
defined and characterized, but there are still significant engineering and/or design changes in the 
system itself. However, preliminary design has been completed and producibility assessments and 
trade studies of key technologies and components are complete. Prototype manufacturing 
processes and technologies, materials, tooling and test equipment, as well as personnel skills have 
been demonstrated on systems and/or subsystems in a production relevant environment. Cost, 
yield and rate analyses have been performed to assess how prototype data compare to target 
objectives, and the program has in place appropriate risk reduction to achieve cost requirements 
or establish a new baseline. This analysis should include design trades. Producibility 
considerations have shaped system development plans. The Industrial Capabilities Assessment 




MRL 7: Capability to produce [parts] in a production representative environment 
 
This level of manufacturing readiness is typical for the mid-point of the Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development (EMD) Phase leading to the Post-CDR Assessment. Technologies 
should be on a path to achieve TRL 7. System detailed design activity is nearing completion. 
Material specifications have been approved and materials are available to meet the planned pilot 
line build schedule. Manufacturing processes and procedures have been demonstrated in a 
production representative environment. Detailed producibility trade studies are completed and 
producibility enhancements and risk assessments are underway. The cost model has been updated 
Materiel Solution 





ASR SRR/SFR PDR CDR PRR/SVR PCA
MRL 4 MRL 5 MRL 6 MRL 7 MRL 8 MRL 9 MRL 10
Technology Maturation and Risk 
Reduction (TMRR)







with detailed designs, rolled up to system level, and tracked against allocated targets. Unit cost 
reduction efforts have been prioritized and are underway. Yield and rate analyses have been 
updated with production representative data. The supply chain and supplier quality assurance 
have been assessed and long-lead procurement plans are in place. Manufacturing plans and 
quality targets have been developed. Production tooling and test equipment design and 
development have been initiated. 
 
MRL 8: Pilot line capability demonstrated; Ready to begin Low Rate Initial Production 
 
This level is associated with readiness for a Milestone C decision, and entry into Low Rate Initial 
Production (LRIP). Technologies should have matured to at least TRL 7 or 8. Detailed system 
design is complete and sufficiently stable to enter low rate production. All materials, manpower, 
tooling, test equipment and facilities are proven on pilot line and are available to meet the 
planned low rate production schedule. Manufacturing and quality processes and procedures have 
been proven in a pilot line environment and are under control and ready for low rate production. 
Known producibility risks pose no significant challenges for low rate production. Cost model and 
yield and rate analyses have been updated with pilot line results. Supplier qualification testing 
and first article inspection have been completed. The Industrial Capabilities Assessment for 
Milestone C has been completed and shows that the supply chain is established to support LRIP. 
 
 
MRL 9: Low rate production demonstrated; Capability in place to begin Full Rate Production 
 
At this level, the system, component or item has been previously produced, is in production, or 
has successfully achieved low rate initial production. Technologies should have matured to TRL 
8 or 9. This level of readiness is normally associated with readiness for entry into Full Rate 
Production (FRP). All systems engineering/design requirements should have been met such that 
there are minimal system changes. Major system design features are stable and have been proven 
in test and evaluation. Materials, parts, manpower, tooling, test equipment and facilities are 
available to meet planned rate production schedules. Manufacturing process capability in a low 
rate production environment is at an appropriate quality level to meet design key characteristic 
tolerances. Production risk monitoring is ongoing. LRIP cost targets have been met, and learning 
curves have been analyzed with actual data. The cost model has been developed for FRP 
environment and reflects the impact of continuous improvement 
 
MRL 10: Full Rate Production demonstrated and lean production practices in place. 
 
This is the highest level of production readiness. Technologies should have matured to TRL 9. 
This level of manufacturing is normally associated with the Production or Sustainment phases of 
the acquisition life cycle. Engineering/design changes are few and generally limited to quality and 
cost improvements. System, components or items are in full rate production and meet all 
engineering, performance, quality and reliability requirements. Manufacturing process capability 
is at the appropriate quality level. All materials, tooling, inspection and test equipment, facilities 
and manpower are in place and have met full rate production requirements. Rate production unit 
costs meet goals, and funding is sufficient for production at required rates. Lean practices are well 




APPENDIX N. UNDERSTANDING THE AUTOMOTIVE QMS 
A collection of personal notes by William Ireland concerning the history of the 
QS-9000 Quality Management System from personal experience and prior publications 
and presentations that are given under Ireland in the List of References of this thesis.  
Notes compiled on 5/29/2017: 
 
The QS-9000 automotive QMS transferred into the ISO/TS-16949 under SAE 
management and are used interchangeably for this research. These standards focused on 
the identification and application of customer specific requirements. In the global 
automotive industry the ISO/TS-16949:2009 through: 2016 continues a compatibility 
with the specifications of Ford, General Motors (GM), Chrysler domestically and 
internationally the German automaker’s VDA6.1 standard, French EAQF standard and 
the Italian automotive standard AVSQ. The ISO/TS-16949 standard is the automotive 
industry’s uniform consensus QMS (AIAG 2006).   
The motivation and implementation of the automotive PPAP provided context to 
assist in the identification of relevant similarities between the alternative non-DOD 
industrial sectors and the DOD. Historically, the American automotive sector faced a dual 
challenge in the 1970s and 1980s. First, poor vehicle quality and reliability resulted in a 
rapid decline of market share. The poor quality was associated with the lack of attention 
OEMs gave to quality in design and manufacturing. In addition, the industry was 
ignoring methods employed by the Japanese auto manufacturers who were adhering to 
statistical quality methods in production.  
Actions to improve production outcomes in the automotive industry came from 
detailed prescriptive requirements and standardization of their QMS. The automotive 
standards required suppliers to follow prescriptive quality practices to satisfy two key 
elements: APQP, representing the development phase of a manufacturing process and 2) 
PPAP, as validating manufacturing process requirements. The GAO did characterize non-
DOD organizations as more successful when they followed a more disciplined 
manufacturing knowledge-based development and production-approval approach. This 
contrasted to the DOD production approval process that was non-standard and risk-based. 
The deficiencies related to DOD acquisition practices represented a knowledge gap in 
process capability failing to be objectively determined as part of production readiness by 
a demonstration prior to production start.  
Insight into the enhancement and unification in automotive quality standards was 
a trend moving key technologies out of the OEMs to create a burgeoning supply base 
where those entities became global suppliers. Examples are companies such as Visteon, 
Bendix Allied Signal, Delphi and TRW. Early attempts by each OEM to manage this 
emerging supply network resulted in the creation of individual OEM QMS requirements.  
A confirming report given by Timothy J. Sturgeon and Richard K. Lester, in their 
February 2003 paper to the World Bank Project on East Asia’s Economic Future stated: 
“The entry of GM’s and Ford’s former component divisions into the merchant market for 
156 
 
vehicle components, modules, and systems has, almost overnight, created the world’s two 
largest, most diversified, and geographically extensive automotive suppliers” (Sturgeon 
and Lester 2003). 
Here, the globalization strategies were enablers to overcome the challenges of an 
Asian invasion into the American automotive sector supporting the divesting of 
component technologies within the OEMs to the supply network. Just prior to the 
automotive industry adoption of their common set of standards, individual OEMs had 
unique QMS requirements for suppliers. Suppliers found themselves burdened with the 
need to comply with three different QMS while essentially producing for a common 
customer with nearly common production technologies - - an onerous cost burden within 
the supply base. The auto industry realized a need to improve their practices in the supply 
network and required an adherence to a common set of standards with the hopes to 
improve production outcomes.  
As the automotive OEMs updated their global QMS they also became system 
integrators. This has similarly occurred in DOD’s prime contractors. This meant that the 
design expertise moved deeper into the supply base. As suppliers became larger global 
enterprises the OEMs and prime government contractors pushed component know-how 
down into the supply chain (Ireland 2000). What Ireland reported establishes a concern 
that there is increased risk to the OEMs and prime contractors requiring a need to assure 
production readiness can be maintained at lower supply tiers.  
These first efforts by the OEMs failed to provide the desired results and led to a 
collaborative effort in the automotive sector. With the formation of the AIAG in 1982, 
the OEMs consolidated the various QMS requirements into a unified set of practices with 
the goal to unburden suppliers and build a consistency in development of product and 
process. The AIAG delivered a unified body of standards applying development and 
support for a common “production approval process.” 
Historically, it may be important to put the movement for a unified QMS standard 
in perspective. The push for standards in manufacturing goes to the war effort in World 
War II. The ISO formation occurred shortly after, in 1947. It was not until the mid-1970s 
that standards became more international. An international view of quality standards was 
launched in 1987 with trading partners globally adopting the European based common set 
of quality management standards known as the ISO-9000 QMS.   
The state of standards prior to this uniform approach included the adaptation of 
national standards. The AIAG used the platform of the ISO-9000 standards to forward the 
automotive industry quality standards from a global perspective. While the core of the 
ISO approach was notionally accepted it did not address the peculiarities of the 
automotive industry. The release of the QS-9000 family of standards was mandated with 
its prescriptive measures of compliance for production demonstration and control. 
Insightfully, the automotive standards approach preserved the belief that the global 
supplier network would have to be ISO-9000 certified by the mid-90s to trade with 
Europe. Therefore, the American automotive effort of standards development used ISO-
9001 as its core to its QMS requirement and then added their unique requirements. This 
would minimize any cost for implementation in DOD acquisition being able to build on 
the existing QMS framework that is based on the ISO-9000.  
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